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Summary findings
If development is seen basically as autonomous self-  One major application of helping theory is to the
development, then there is a subtle paradox in the whole  problems of knowledge-based developniei-  assistance.
notion of development assistance: How can an outside  The standard approach is that the helper, a knowledge-
party ("helper") assist those undertaking autonomous  based development agency, has the "answe:s" and
activities (the "doers") without overriding or  disseminates them to the doers. This correnDonds  to the
undercutting their autonomy? This conundrum is the  standard teacher-centered pedagogy. The a ternative
challenge facing a theory of autonomy-compatible  under helping theory is the learner-centered approach.
development assistance-that  is, helping theory.  The teacher plays the role of midwife, catalyst, and
Starting from a simple model of nondistortionarv  aid,  facilitator, building learning capacity in the learner-doers
Ellerman explores several themes of a broader helping  so that they can learn from any source, incl iding their
theory and shows how these themes arise in the work of  own experience.
"gurus"~  in different fields-John  Dewey in pedagogy and  Development assistance is further compli :ated by the
social philosophy, Douglas McGregor in management  local or tacit nature of much relevant know/ edge. A
theory, Carl Rogers in psychotherapy, Soren Kierkegaard  knowledge-based development agency might function
in spiritual counseling, Saul Alinsky in community  better nor simply as a source of knowledge hut as a
organizing, Paulo Freire in community education, and  broker connecting those who face problem, with those in
Albert Hirschman and E. F. Schumacher in economic  similar situations who have learned how to address the
development. That such diverse thinkers in such different  problems.
fields arrive at very similar conclusions increases  Changing to the approach of helping the( rv entails
confidence  in the common  principles.  The  points  of  changing  the  helping  agency  itself, transforr  ling  it into
commonality are summarized as follows:  an organization that fosters learning internally as well as
*  Help must start from the present situation of the  externally-as  in a university, wlhere profeswors  engage in
doers.  learning and foster learning in students but the
*  Helpers must see the situation through the eves of  organization does not adopt official views o i the
the doers.  complex questions of the day. This means fi stering
*  Help cannot be imposed on the doers, as that  competition in the marketplace of ideas wi6tin the
directlv violates their autonomy.  organization and taking a more Socratic starce with
* Nor can doers receive help as a benevolent gift, as  clients, who will then have to take responsiHilirt for and
that creates dependency.  have ownership of their decisions.
*  Doers must be in the driver's seat.
This paper-a  product of the Office of the Senior Vice President, Development Economics-is  part of a large  r effort in the
Bank to understand the intellectual foundations for autonomy-compatible assistance as espoused in the  Comprehensive
Development Framework and the Bank's Mission Statement. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Banik,
18 18 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Beza  Mekuria, room MC4-358,  telephone 202-458-2756,  fax
202-522-1158,  email address bmekuria(a worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted ( n the Web at
http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted at dellermanCa  worldbank.org.  October 2001. (4 q pages)
Th7e  Policy Research Wforking  Paper Series dissemninates  the findings of work  in progress to encourage the excIanmqe  of  idc;s abowt
development  issoies. A-i objective  ofthe  series is to get  the findings  ouft quickly,  eveni if the presentations  are less than  fullv  polished.  The
papers  carry the  tiames  of  the  auithors and  should  he cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  expressed  in  this
paper  are entirely  those  of  the  auithors.  They  d<o  not  necessarily  represent  the  view, of  the  World  Bank.  its  Executive  Director;,  or  the
couintries  they  represent.
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"The best kind of help to others, whenever possible, is indirect, and consists in such modifications of the
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The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be
attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to the members of its Board of Directors or the
countries they represent.Intellectual  Background
The World Bank, the leading multilateral development  agency, begins its Mission Statement with a
dedication to helping people help themselves, and Oxfam, a leading non-governmental  organization
working on development, states that its "main aim is to help people to help themselves." '  There is
broad agreement-at  least as a statement of high purpose-that  helping people help themselves is
perhaps the best ("best" in perhaps both a normative and practical sense) methodology for development
assistance in the developing countries. That is our topic.
The main goal is the "doer" (e.g., person, group, or country) being "in the driver's seat" and actively
helping itself. This is a central idea expressed in the World Bank's Comprehensive  Development
Framework (CDF). 2 If development is seen basically as autonomous  self-development,  then there is a
subtle paradox or conundrum in the whole notion of development assistance: how can an outside party
("helper") assist those who are undertaking autonomous activities (the "doers") without overriding or
undercutting their autonomy? 3 How can a development agency actually help people help themselves-
as opposed to giving various forms of unhelpful help? The topic is related to the presumption in favor
of inclusion, popular participation,  involvement, and ownership as well as the suspicion that externally
applied "carrots and sticks" do not "buy" sustainable policy changes. Our approach uses the (Kantian)
notion of autonomy [see Ellermnan  1988] and has much overlap with Albert Hirschman's approach to
development (see last section) and with Amartya Sen's emphasis on capabilities and agency. 4
We cast a wide and vigorously multidisciplinary  net to construct the intellectual background. Helping
theory is approached by looking at the commonalties in quite different examples of relationships where
one party, the "helper," is trying to help certain others, here called the "doers,"  to better help
themselves. The target example of the helper-doer relationship is the relationship  between a
development agency and a client country but the theme is also explored in pedagogy,  management
theory, psychotherapy, community organization,  and community  education. The helper-doer
relationships and prominent authors or "gurus"  are (see Appendix for representative quotes):
- Albert Hirschman on the relationship of a development advisor and a government,
- E.F. Schumacher on the relationship between a development agency and a developing country,
*  Saul Alinsky on the relation of a community  organizer to the community,
*  Paulo Freire on the relationship between an educator and a peasant (or urban poor) community,
*  S0ren Kierkegaard on the relation between a spiritual counselor  and a student,
*  John Dewey on the teacher-learner relationship,
*  Carl Rogers on the therapist-client relationship, and
*  Douglas McGregor on the (Theory Y) relationship between a manager and workers.
The argument is not that all these relationships are the same, but that there are commonalties when the
party in the "helper" role acts so as to help the parties in the "doer" role to help themselves. The fact
that such diverse thinkers in different fields arrive at interestingly  similar conclusions increases our
'Oxfam  1985.  14.
2  See  Wolfensohn  1997,  1998,  1999a  and 1999b  and in Stiglitz  1998.
3See  Ellwood  [1988]  generally  on the "helping  conundrums."
4  Sen's  notion  of freedom  in Development  as Freedom 1999  is closely  related  to our  notion  of autonomy.confidence in the common principles. 5 The text is liberally sprinkled with quotations and footnotes so
that the interested reader can follow the Ariadne's thread of the themes back into the original texts.
An Initial Look at Non-Distortionary  Aid
Non-Distortionary  Interventions
Our first task is to fix the sense of an intervention by the helper that most respects or is most
compatible with the choices of the doer in certain simple models of the doer's decisions. The doer's
decision-making is assumed to be given as a relationship between resources and decisions: given the
resources available to the doer, the optimal decision is determined. An intervention by the helper is
non-distortionary (ND) (a necessary condition for autonomy-compatibility)  if it does not affect the
relationship between resources and decisions although it may affect the resources. In other words, a
ND intervention is one that does not change what the doer would do-given  sufficient resources. In
that sense, the intervention does not distort the original motivation of the doer.
This notion looks only to the mode of intervention by the helper, not to the preferences or choices.
There is no assumption that the choices of the doer are in any sense autonomous, e.g., a monetary gift
to a drug addict or an unrestricted grant to a country "addicted"  to aid would be ND.  Choices that are
autonomous in the sense of being based on intrinsic or own-motivation  will be considered later.
Moreover, "non-distortionary"  is an autonomy-related  characteristic of interventions  by some human
will (e.g., the helper), not natural events.
'The nature of things does not madden us, only ill will does', said Rousseau.  The
criterion of oppression is the part that I believe to be played by other human beings,
directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in frustrating my wishes.
[Berlin 1969, 123]
Natural events on Crusoe's island might affect his choices but would not be classified as
"interventions"  at all.
If we think of the doer as a consumer allocating fixed income between goods, then a "lump-sum"
income tax or subsidy  would be an example of a ND intervention in contrast to an excise tax or subsidy
attached to particular uses or goods. The relationship between income and consumer choices is the
"income-consumption  curve", so a ND intervention (e.g., a lump-sum change in income) is one that
does not shift the income consumption curve.6
5For  instance, here is the helping conundrum  that arises in education. This "learning paradox" was clearly posed by the
early twentieth century Socratic-Kantian  Leonard Nelson:
"Here we actually come up against the basic problem of education, which in its general form points to the
question: How is education at all possible?  If the end of education is rational self-determination, i.e., a
condition in which the individual does not allow his behavior to be determined by outside influences but
judges and acts according to his own insight, the question arises: How can we affect a person by outside
influences so that he will not permit himself to be affected by outside influences?  We must resolve this
paradox or abandon the task of education." [Nelson 1949, 18-9]
6  In more  general mathematical terms, suppose the decision problem is to maximize an objective function subject to some
constraints. An intervention  would then be " non-distortionary"  if it relaxed or tightened some constraints but did not affect
the first-order marginal conditions for optimization.
2Let us now turn to yes-or-no decisions about undertaking a project or activity (e.g., making a certain
reform). Given the relationship between resources and yes-or-no decisions, a ND intervention is one
that affects the decision only by affecting the resources, not by changing the relationship between
resources and decisions. For instance, an unrestricted grant of resources would be ND but aid with
conditionalities would probably not be ND (unless the conditionalities  were in effect vacuous). Non-
distortionary aid might make a worthwhile project possible while distortionary aid aims to make some
project "worthwhile."
Numerical Example:  The development agency wants the doer to undertake a certain
project where the doer lacks a necessary  resource. The resource has a value of 75 which
represents the alternative value of the resource without the project. There are two cases.
In the 1st case (top row) the benefit of the project for the doer is 100, and in the 2nd  case
(2nd  row) the benefit to the doer is 50 (although we could again take the total social gain
as 100 so the agency would still have reason to give aid).  If the agency charges 75 for
the resource (say, with the cost paid out of benefits), the doer will undertake the project
in the first case but not the second.  But suppose the resource is given for free as aid.
The  resource-as-aid could be  conditional on  undertaking the  project  or  could  be
unconditional. This generates a 2 x 2 table of possibilities.
Table 1  Conditional Aid  Unconditional Aid
Case 1:  Project = Yes  Project = Yes
Benefit=  100  Gain=  100  Gain=  100
Resource = 75  Aid is "ND."  Aid is ND.
(but condition is pointless)  Agency gives aid.
Case 2:  Project= Yes  Project = No
Benefit = 50  Gain= 50  Gain = 75
Resource = 75  Aid would not be ND.  Agency would probably not
Give aid or not?  give unrestricted aid.
To make the comparison with the distortionary versus non-distortionary (lump-sum)
taxes or subsidies, the conditional aid is like a distortionary subsidy to the yes-option
but not to the no-option.  The unconditional aid is a non-distorting lump-sum subsidy
which could be applied to either option.  The unconditional aid is thus ND but the
agency would not give unconditional aid in the 2nd case since the doer would cash in the
resource for a gain of 75 and the project would not be undertaken.  The important case
of  distorting aid is the  aid in the  2nd  case (private benefit =  50) when the  aid is
conditional on undertaking the project. Then the conditionality  "supplies motivation" to
change the "no" to a "yes" and is thus distorting.
In the remaining instance of conditional aid in the 1st case, the aid is conditional but is
ND because the condition does not actually change or distort the yes-or-no decision and
is thus pointless.  Thus the conditional aid is "fully effective only when it does not
achieve  anything...  ."  [Hirschman 1971, 204]  Indeed there  might  be  a  negative
reactance effect on the part of the doer who bears the "insulting" conditionality to do
3what  the  doer  wanted  to  do  anyway.  The  controversy,  however,  centers  on  the  clear
case of distorting motivation  (conditional  aid in the 2nd  case).
We have defined  a ND intervention  given the framing of a decision but much controversy  arises from
different  interpretations  or frames  for a decision.  An optimistic  observer  might picture The doer as
being genuinely motivated  to undertake  a certain  autonomy-enhancing  action or reform,  but that action
requires  a certain  amount of money.  Hence the helper might provide the monev withou:  strings
attached  as ND  help and then hopefully  the action would  be undertaken.
A pessimistic  observer  might offer a different  way to frame the situation  that would give a different
result.  The doer is motivated  to undertake  the autonomy-enhancing  action partly because  otherwise  the
doer would suffer  certain consequences  of not reforming.  When the helper offers the nci-strings-
attached aid, then the aid could be used to soften  or avoid the adverse consequences  so t  lie doer is no
longer as strongly motivated  to undertake  the action or reformii.
In Case 2, the helper might be inclined to offer the aid conditional  on taking the action, but then the aid
is distortionary.  The reform, which  is typically hard to monitor,  mighit not be performed  very
effectively  since the doer is undertaking  it only because  of the "supplied external  motivation"-not
because  of the doer's "own" motivation.  Indeed,  from a dynamic  perspective,  there  is ar. incentive  for
failure  so that the doer will still qualify for the aid the next time around.'  Charles  Murray traces this
failure to: "The Law of Unintended  Rewards.  Any social transfer increases the net value  of being in
the condition that prompted the transfer.  ... The program that seeks to change behavior  nmust  offer an
inducement  that unavoidably  either adds to the attraction  of. or reduces the penalties of engaging  in, the
behavior  in question."  [Murray  1984, 212-5]  In an actual situation,  where the benefits  are not directly
observable,  the helper may not know  if Case 1 or 2 applied.
Taking  an analogy between aid for reform  and a wage for labor. it is useful to review  thc economic
analysis of a wage increase  in terms of a substitution  effect and an income effect.  The wage increase
heightens  the reward for labor so the substitution  effect is an increase  in labor offered.  EIut  if the labor
is motivated  to get income for other purposes,  then the wage increase allows  the same income  to be
received with less labor so the income effect  is to decrease  the labor offered.  The two effects go in
opposite  directions  so their relative  strengths  will determine  if the labor offered  increases  (upward
sloping supply curve) or decreases (backward  bending supply curve).
Another  useful  model is the problem  of moral hazard in insuranice. The action  or reform  in this  case is
the set of precautions  that one might take to avoid accidents.  If those precautions  are moitivated by the
adverse  consequences  of accidents  that might otherwise  lhappen and if those adverse  consequences  can
be covered  by insurance  payments,  then complete  insurance would remove  the motivation  to take
precautions.  Thus insurance  might increase  the probability  of accidents  (since it removes the
motivation  for the "reform"  of taking precautions)  and that  is called "moral hazard."  On the moral
hazard  interpretation  of Case 2, the unrestricted  aid covers the downside of not taking th.- action  so
non-action  becomes  the preferred  option.
Let us return to the helping  conundrum.  If the doers have sufficient own-motivation  to help themselves
then  non-distortionary  aid to supply the means would indeed help the doers to help  themselves.  But if
Testimony  to this incentive  is given  by the worry  about  "punishing"  successful  reformers  by  not renewing  aid.
4the doers are motivated to help themselves primarily  in order to avoid certain adverse consequences
and if unrestricted aid could itself alleviate those consequences,  then the aid would subsidize the doers
not helping themselves. Thus the aid agencies and international finance institutions "should help
finance the costs of change-and  should not cover the costs of not changing." [Stem 2001]
Once the helping conundrum is understood, there are essentially  two possible paths that helpers can
take.  One path might be called the direct or social engineering  approach to "supply the motivation" to
undertake the reforms by imposing the distorting conditionality  in order to receive the aid. This is the
most common approach in the "development  assistance  business." By supplying the motivation, the
helper essentially takes over "the driver's seat" in a principal-agent  relationship to distort the doers'
motivation toward compliance and to monitor their compliance. 8
The other path is our topic of helping theory, autonomy-compatible  (e.g., non-distorting)  modes of
helping people help themselves.  This path is more indirect; motivation is to be found and fostered
rather than supplied by the helpers. Indeed, intrinsic, internal, or own motivation on the part of the
doers could not, by definition, be "supplied"  by the helpers. Bought virtue is faux virtue. If the doers
are intrinsically motivated to undertake the action or project, then the external aid will be enabling
rather than "motivating."
Intrinsic or Own Motivation
There is now a large body of literature in psychology,  sociology, and organizational  behavior on
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as well as the closely related notions of self-determination,
autonomy, and internal locus of causality. 9 Although considerations of intrinsic motivation have
figured prominently in the Romantic critique'°  of classical economics, the topic has until recently only
received sporadic treatment in economics literature."  Bruno Frey's recent Not Just for the Money
[1997] is the first book-length treatment of the topic of intrinsic motivation in the economics literature.
In the literature on aid for economic development, a substantial body of research now questions the
effectiveness of conditionalities." 2 What is the distinction  between genuinely wanting to change or only
wanting to make certain changes because of various "carrots  and sticks"?  Conditionalities  and aid
provide only external or extrinsic motivation; genuine change requires a more intrinsic motivation.
An intrinsically motivated activity is an activity carried out by individuals for its own sake. The
activity is an end in itself, not an instrumental means to some other end (such as satisfying biological
needs or "tissue deficits"). The factors that determine  the meaning of "for its own sake" are usually
based on the self-identity of the person or persons carrying out the activity. An intrinsically motivated
activity might be accompanied by extrinsic motivators if the latter are not controlling and operate
8  It will be noted that we are unrealistically modelling  the "doers" as a homogeneous  group whereas much of the work in
development  assistance is in reinforcing the reform-oriented doers against the non-reforming doers within a government.
This neglect of coalitional politics is deliberate. Outside a narrow category of stroke-of-the-pen  reforms, more institutional
reforms require a broader consensus and a deeper "buy-in" than can be provided with aid bribes.
9 See Deci and Ryan 1985,  Elster 1983,  Lane 1991,  Candy 1991,  Kohn 1993,  and Deming 1994.
10  See, for example, Ruskin 1985 (1862), and for a recent broad approach, see Lutz 1999.
"  See Titmuss 1970,  Arrow 1972, Scitovsky 1976,  Hirsch 1976, Sen 1982,  Schelling 1984,  Akerlof 1984,  Hirschman
1992, Kreps 1997,  and Prendergast 1999.
12  See the discussion and references in World Bank 1998 and Killick et al. 1998.
5quietly "in the background," i.e., if they do not take over the locus of causality.  13  For instance,
professors typically pursue their professional work for its own sake even though there is a salary and
other emoluments in the background. Indeed much of the story is concerned with the question of the
locus of causality for an activity. Autonomous activity has an internal locus of causality. A bribe
(carrot) or threat (stick) to get one to do what one would not otherwise do (given the resources)
switches one from an internal to an external locus of causality (reverses foreground and background);
the activity is then non-autonomous  or heteronomous. The classical sins such as greed, envy, and pride
could be rendered in this simple framework as the cancerous growth of extrinsic motivation into
passions that take over the foreground of motivation." 4
Much of what I will say about "internal"  and "external" motivation will be a reformulation, if not a
translation, of older philosophical concepts into "modern"  psychological  terminology [see Maslow
1968 for a recent version]. There is a very old philosophical theme, often associated with the Stoics,
that divides the self into a higher, inner, and "noumenal" self or "soul" and a lower, empirical, and
phenomenal self. The lower self is typically under the influence of the passions and irrational impulses
and sees the world only darkly through a veil of opinion and prejudice while the higher self can at least
potentially be free of being controlled  these external influences, and can be guided by critical reason
and motivated by autonomous volitions. Much of what will be said about "external motivation" can be
taken a modern version of the influences of the lower self, while "internal motivation" represents the
volitional side of the higher self.
The roots of intrinsic motivation such as an individual's self-identity  (including the larger social units
with which the person identifies) are typically not open to intentional and deliberate choice.  One
chooses according to who one is, but one does not directly choose who one is.  These basic
"preferences" can change but more as an indirect "by-product  of actions undertaken for other ends"
IElster 1983, 43] than as the result of deliberate actions. For instance, one cannot simply decide to be
"in love" and thus one cannot "buy love."  This "can't-buy-love"  situation limits the domain of the
market and the reach of extrinsic motivators.  "Carrots and sticks" might buy or induce compliant
behaviors, but they cannot directly  cause changes in the determinants of intrinsic motivation.
In economics, individual human action is modeled as the maximization of utility or preferences within
constraints given by technique, institutions, and economic resources. "Utility" subsumes all as the
common coin of human motivation. Since intrinsic motivation can be seen as another source of utility,
why is it important to treat it separately? There are three broad categories of reasons: (1) extrinsic
incentives and choice-determined characteristics  are only "half of the story" so "economic" and
"rational choice" approaches to institutional design will be somewhat  incomplete, (2) a resentment or
negative reactance to a threatened loss of autonomy may result from using extrinsic motivation to try to
"take control" of a person's behavior (which in turn affects performance),  and (3) extrinsic motivation
may crowd out and eventually atrophy intrinsic motivation."5
See Deci and Ryan 1985 for the notion of locus of causality and Lefcourst 1976  for the notion of locus Cf control. We
use the notions of having an internal locus of causality (or control), self-deterrnination,  intrinsicly  or own-rmotivated  activity,
and autonomy as being synonymous  for our broad purposes.
14 See Hirschman 1977.
Is Frey's "crowding-out effect" is what Lane 1991 calls the "hidden cost effect" following  the idea of the "hidden cost of
rewards" as in Lepper and Greene 1978.
6Towards a Broader Helping Theory: Five Themes
The quintessential  problem  of autonomy-compatible  intervention  is how  to "help  people  to help
themselves."  So far, we have  used a simple  one-dimensional  model  of help,  namely  giving  a certain
amount  of aid in a "non-distortionary"  manner  (that  is, "lump-sum"  or unrestricted  aid). Now we
consider  the general  case  of intervention  with includes  technical  cooperation,  dialogue,  and capacity-
building  in addition  to simple  resource  transfers. We leave  behind  simple  precise  models  to develop
five themes  that describe  autonomy-compatible  help  in a more  general  and realistic  setting.
Theme 1: Starting  From  Where  the Doers  Are
A utopian  social  engineering  approach  tries  to impose  a clean  model  solution  where,  if necessary,  the
old solution  is wiped  away  to make  room  for the new. To use a building  metaphor,  the old building  is
torn down  to create  a cleared  space,  a tabula  rasa,  upon  which  the new  model  building  can be
constructed.  There is no need  to take  the characteristics  of the old building  into account-other than
what is required  to tear it down.  The alternative  non-utopian  incremental  approach  would  be to repair
one  part of the building  at a time-which over  time can still  completely  rebuild  the building.  To use a
repairing  the ship  metaphor,  the engineering  approach  would  put the ship  into dry dock so that standard
techniques  can be used to repair  the ship  independent  of the conditions  at sea. The incremental
alternative  is, according  to Otto  Neurath's  metaphor,  to "repair  the ship  at sea" taking  into account  the
available  techniques  and the conditions  at sea [See  Elster  et al. 1998]. Rebuilding  the old, rather  than
destroying  it to engineer  a new model  from  the cleaned  slate,  is one  way  of introducing  the theme  of
"starting  from where  the doers  are." For the helpers  to help  the doers  help  themselves,  the helpers  have
to design  their  assistance  taking  into account  the current  starting  point  of the doers,  not an imaginary
clean  slate.
Theme  2: Seeing  Through  the Doers'  Eyes
Since  the goal  is for the doers  to help themselves,  any assistance  provided  by the helpers  needs  to see
the situation  through  the doers'  eyes. The doers'  actions  will be guided  by their  knowledge,  conceptual
framework,  values,  and  worldview,  not those  of the helpers. The strategy  of help used  by the helpers
needs  to be based  on an empathetic  understanding  of the doers'  viewvpoint  in order  to be effective.
Theme  3: Helper  Cannot  Impose  Change  on Doers
This is the counter-thesis  to the direct  or social  engineering  approach.  Transformative  change  comes
from the internally  motivated  self-activities  of the doers. Carrots  and  sticks  (e.g.,  aid conditionalities)
used by the "helpers"  will distort  the own-motivation  of the doers,  externalize  their locus  of causality,
and  may  produce  conforming  surface  behavior  and cunning  resistance  rather  than  transformation.
Theme  4: Help  as Benevolence  is Ineffective
Autonomy-compatible  assistance  is neither  an imposition  (theme  3) nor a gift (theme  4). Benevolent
charity  helps  people,  but it does not help  people  help  themselves.  It promotes  dependency,  not
autonomy.  The helpers  are self-satisfied  that  their charity  is helping  others,  but the doers  are in the
humiliating  and  degrading  position  of not helping  themselves  with  the resulting  resentment  and
thwarted  self-reliance.
Theme  5: Doers  in the Driver's  Seat
This central  theme  is simply  a restatement  of the goal  of the assistance,  to have  the doers  helping
themselves.  "Being  in the driver's  seat"  is the metaphor  for autonomous  self-activity.  The car
7metaphor comports well with the other four themes. The car must: (1) start its journey from where
doer-driver is, (2) the vision of the road ahead is from the vantage point of the driver, (3) it would be
folly for guides (or "backseat drivers") to grab the steering wheel and try to drive, and (4) being driven
by someone else weakens self-reliance and self-esteem.
Helping  Theory Applied  to Development  Assistance
Development Intervention  as an "Agency" Relationship
We now focus on elaborating the five themes in the context of community and economic development.
The assumed setting is now that of an external development organization (the "helper") trying to help
economic development in a less-developed country (the "doers"). We are concerned with development
projects that involve changing human institutions, not with physical construction projects.  We begin
with what might be the standard implicit or explicit model of the relationship between the development
organization and the client country, namely the principal-agent or agency relationship [e.g., see Killick
et al. 1998]. How can the development organization as principal, design a package of incentives-
carrots and sticks-to  induce the desired actions on the part of the client country as agent?
The economic theory of agency" is one of the most sophisticated  forms of the carrots-and-sticks
engineering approach to human affairs so it will be worthwhile to examine it in a development context.
For example, Killick [1998] applies agency language where an international financial institution (IFI)
is the "principal" and the developing country is the "agent."
The first mistake in this approach is the model itself. In an agency relationship, "one person [the agent]
acts for or represents another by [the] latter's authority" [Black 1968, entry under "Agency"]. Yet, the
client country has no such agency relationship  to the development organization; the client country does
not have a legal or institutional role to act for or represent the development agency. In general, the
creditor-debtor relationship is not, in the legal sense, a principal-agent relationship but is a more
general contractual relationship. If we analogize with, say, the doctor-patient or lawyer-client
relationship, then it is the other way around. If the development organization is seen more as a "doctor
for countries" in a doctor-patient relationship,  then it should be noted that the doctor is ordinarily
considered the agent,' 7 not the principal. The doctor or the lawyer is supposed  to use specialized
expertise and knowledge in the interests of the patient or client by the latter's authorization.
Leaving aside the tellingly mistaken characterization  of the relationship, the development agency might
be viewed as a doctor, therapist, teacher, or helper who would promote certain changes in the patient,
client, learner, or doer. The standard tools are economic incentives such as loans on favorable terms or
grants, both only if certain conditions or "conditionalities"  are satisfied. Here we see the second
dubious assumption in the standard relationship  between development agency and client country-
namely the assumption that the desired changes (e.g., institutional development)  are the objects of
direct choice rather than the indirect "by-products  of other actions." There are, of course, certain
16  The phrases "principal-agent  relation" and "agency relation" have been imported into economics [see Ross 1973, Stiglitz
1974,  Campbell 19951  from legal theory but are then used to denote contractual relationships that are not agency relations in
the original legal sense.  Agency relations tend to arise from large asymmetries in knowledge and monitoring ability so the
principal cannot contractually specify the detailed actions of the agent (e.g., doctor or lawyer). Instead the agent takes on a
legal or institutional fiduciary role involving the trust to "act for or in the interest of' the principal.  Since information is
always imperfect and each party to a contract would like to influence the behavior of the other concerning unspecified
actions, economists have applied the "agency" phraseology to the general economic theory of contractual incentives.
1'  See Arrow 1963 or Pauly 1980.
8stroke-of-the-pen reforms that are within the domain of a government's  deliberate action (e.g., striking
down a tariff, setting exchange rates, changing tax rates).
Institutional reforms lie at the opposite end of the simplicity-complexity spectrum by
comparison with currency devaluations: they are not for the most part amenable to
treatment as preconditions; donor agencies are liable to  have difficulties in keeping
track of the extent of compliance; and such reforms are often imperfectly under the
control of the central authorities, take time, typically involve a number of agencies and
are liable to encounter opposition from well-entrenched beneficiaries of the status quo.
[Killick et al. 1998, 40]'8
The institutions, not to mention the mindsets, norms, and culture, of a country are based in part on the
country's collective self-identity. To metaphorically  carry over the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation from an individual to the collectivity of people who make up a country, we might say that
the culture and basic institutional habits are expressions of "intrinsic motivation" based on the country's
self-identity. Short-term behaviors can be "bought" with sufficient extrinsic incentives to temporarily
override the more intrinsic incentives of governmental  policy-makers,  but that by itself is not
transformative in the sense of changing the institutional and cultural roots of long-term behavior.
The standard model of development "assistance"  tends to be heteronomous,  and therein lies its
ineffectiveness. Long-term economic transformation grows, in the last analysis, out of autonomous
activity. One way or another, a country must find the internal loci of causality necessary for
autonomous development. External development assistance-to  "do no harm," not to mention to be
effective-must  be autonomy-compatible.'9
Theme 1 Applied: Starting from Present Institutions
To be transformative, a process of change must start from and engage the present endowment of
institutions. Otherwise, the process will only create an overlay of new behaviors that is not sustainable
(without continual bribes or coercion). Yet this is a common error.
An  unwillingness  to  start  from  where  you  are  ranks  as  a  fallacy  of  historic
proportions;....  It is because the lesson of the past seems to be so clear on this score,
because the nature of man so definitely confirms it, that there has been this perhaps
tiresome repetition throughout this record: the people must be in on the planning; their
existing institutions must be made part of it; self-education of the citizenry is more
important than specific projects or physical changes. [Lilienthal 1944, 198]
There a number of reasons why development interventions  are often not designed to begin with
existing institutions. Revolutionaries and reformers oriented towards utopian social engineering [see
Popper 1962] aim to wipe the slate clean in order to install a set of "ideal" institutions.  Any attempt to
evolve out of the current "flawed," "retrograde," or even "evil" institutions is viewed as only staining or
polluting the change process. For instance in the transitional economies such as Russia, the "leap over
the chasm" imposed by institutional shock therapy fell far short of the other side since people "need a
18 See Israel [1987] for a specificity spectrum  much like this simplicity-complexity  spectrum.
9  Previous (non-mainstream)  work in the direction of autonomous  and self-reliant  development includes Goulet 1971,
Kohr 1973,  Galtung et al. 1980,  Gran 1983, Korten and Klauss (eds.) 1984,  Verhagen 1987, Rahman 1993,  Eade 1997,
Carmen 1996,  Uphoffet al. 1998, Black 1999,  and Carmen and Sobrado 2000.
9bridge to cross from their own experience to a new way." [Alinsky 197  1, xxi]  It will take the country
much longer to climb out of the chasm than it would have taken if a bridge over the chasm had been
built incrementally in the first place.
In spite of a rather "moralistic"  outlook, Woodrow Wilson nevertheless made a case for an incremental
approach in his first inaugural address.
We shall deal with our economic system as it is and as it might be modified, not as it
might be if we had a clean sheet of paper to write upon; and step by step we shall make
it what it should be, in the spirit of those who question their own wisdom and seek
council and knowledge, not  shallow self-satisfaction or the excitement of  excursion
whither they cannot tell. 20
Similar considerations argue for an evolutionary  and incremental  strategy in poor countries rather than
trying to "jump" to new institutions.
The primary causes of extreme poverty are immaterial, they lie in certain deficiencies in
education, organization, and discipline.... Here lies the reason why development cannot
be an act of creation, why it cannot be ordered, bought, comprehensively planned: why
it requires a process of evolution.  Education does not "jump"; it is a gradual process of
great subtlety.  Organization does not "jump"; it must gradually evolve to fit changing
circumstances.  And much the same goes for discipline.  All three must evolve step by
step, and the foremost task of development policy must be to  speed this evolution.
[Schumacher 1973, 168-9]
Given a choice between the momentum of bottom-up involvement in "flawed"  reforms and top-down
imposition of what reformers see as "model" institutions, the "start from where the doers are" principle
would argue in favor of using knowledge and experience  to work to improve "flawed reforms" using
the bottom-up approach to transformation-rather  than throwing it overboard in favor of utopian social
engineering  based on the false hope of imposed "first best models." 2"
Theme 2 Applied:  Seeing the World Through the Eyes  of the Client
If a utopian social engineer could perform an "institutional lobotomy"  to erase the present institutions,
then development advice would not need to be tailored to present circumstances. Generic advice
would suffice; one message would fit all blank slates. But failing that, it is necessary  to acquire a
deeper knowledge of the present institutions. This is done by, in effect, learning to see the world
through the eyes of the policy-makers and people in the country.
An autonomy-compatible interaction between teacher and learner requires that the teacher have an
empathetic understanding with the student. If the teacher can understand the learning experience of the
student, then the teacher can use his or her superior knowledge to help the student. This help does not
take the form of telling the student the answer or solution, but of offering advice or guidance, perhaps
away from a dead-end path, to assist the student in the active appropriation  of knowledge. The teacher,
20  Quoted in Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963, 71-2 in the context of their treatment of "disjointed incrementalism." Also
quoted in Hirschman 1973, 249.
21  For recent literature on institutional  reforms in a world of "second bests," see Komesar 1994 and Rubin 1996.
10according to Dewey's learner-centered  pedagogy, must be able to see the world through the eyes of the
students and within the limits of their experience, and at the same time apply the adult's viewpoint to
offer guide posts.  Similarly,  in Carl Rogers' notion of client-centered  therapy, the counselor needs to
enter the "internal frame of reference  of the client" in order that assistance can be given that respects
and relies upon the actual capacity of the person. 22
In the context of adult transformation,  how does the educator/investigator  find out about the client-
student's world?  That is the role of Freire's notion of dialogue. In the non-dialogical notion of
education, the teacher determines  the appropriate messages to be delivered or "deposited" in the
students, as money is deposited in a bank.  Instead of ready-made  best-practice recipes, Freire, like
Dewey, saw the educational mission as based on posing problems, essentially  the problems that were
based on the students' world.
In contrast with the antidialogical and non-communicative "deposits" of the banking
method of education, the program content of the problem-posing method-dialogical
par excellence-is  constituted and organized by the students' view of the world, where
their own generative themes are found. [Freire 1970, 1  01  ]
Yet often to development "professionals,  it seems absurd to consider the necessity of respecting the
'view of the world' held by the people." [Freire 1970, 153-4]
[D]evelopment experience has shown that when external experts alone acquire, analyze,
and process information and then present this  information in reports, social change
usually does not take place; whereas the kind of "social learning" that  stakeholders
generate and internalize during the participatory planning and/or implementation of a
development activity does enable social change. [World  Bank 1996, 5]
Theme 3 Applied: Transformation  Cannot be Externally Imposed
Externally applied carrots and sticks can only be applied to behavior within the scope of deliberate
action.  Transformation  is the indirect byproduct of one's authentic activities, not the direct object of
choice.  External incentives can buy "loving  behavior," "assertions  of belief," or "gestures of faith"-
but being in love, believing in a principle, and having a faith all come by the "grace" of transformation,
not by the vagaries of consumer choice.
This much seems clear:  effective change cannot be imposed from outside.  Indeed, the
attempt  to  impose change from the outside is  as likely to  engender resistance and
barriers to change, as it is to facilitate change. At the heart of development is a change
in ways of thinking, and individuals cannot be forced to change how they think.  They
can be forced to take certain actions.  They can be even forced to utter certain words.
But they cannot be forced to change their hearts or minds. [Stiglitz 1998]
22  Maurice Friedman [1960] emphasizes the importance  of seeing  through the eyes of the other in Buber's notion of
dialogue.  "The essential element of genuine dialogue ... is 'seeing the other' or 'experiencing  the other side.' [87] This
'inclusiveness'  is of the essence of the dialogical relation, for the teacher sees the position of the other in his concrete
actuality yet does not lose sight of his own. [177] Particularly important in this relationship is what Buber has variously
called 'seeing the other,''experiencing the other side,''inclusion,' and 'making  the other present.' This 'seeing the other' is not
... a matter of 'identification' or 'empathy,'  but of a concrete imagining  of the other side which does not at the same time lose
sight of one's own." [188-9]
11The idea that one person cannot simply change a judgment or preference at the behest of :nother has an
old and venerable tradition. Indeed, Martin Luther's principle of liberty of conscience was one of the
root principles of the Reformation and one of the main sources of the theory of inalienable rights
(which placed limits on the reach of the market). It is impossible for a person to alienate his decision-
making power to the Church on matters of faith.
Furthermore, every man is responsible for his own faith, and he must see it for himself
that he believes rightly. As little as another can go to hell or heaven for me, so little can
he believe or disbelieve for me; and as little as he can open or shut heaven or hell for
me, so little can he drive me to faith or unbelief. [Luther 1942 (1522), 316]
Authorities, secular or religious, who try to compel belief can only secure external conformity.
Besides, the blind, wretched folk do not see how utterly hopeless and impossible a thing
they are attempting.  For no matter how much they fret and fume, they cannot do more
than make people obey them by word or deed; the heart they cannot constrain, though
they wear themselves out trying. For the proverb is true, "Thoughts are free."  WI-y  then
would  they constrain people  to  believe from  the  heart,  when they  see  that  it  is
impossible? [Luther 1942 (1522), 316]
Development agencies that try to "buy" policy changes "cannot do more than make people obey them
by word or deed; the heart they cannot constrain, though they wear themselves out trying.'
The opposite to an agency's autonomy-compatible  interaction with a client is a heteronomous (external
compulsion) intervention based on the theory that the coerced client will then "see the light" and
continue along the reformed path without further externally applied "carrots or sticks." This might be
called the "bait and switch theory."  External incentives ("bait") will lead to a transformation and
switch-over  to something akin to intrinsic incentives that will thereafter suffice. This strategy is not
impossible but it is unlikely to lead to sustainable changes.
Moreover, the method of awakening and enlisting the activities of all concerned in
pursuit of the end seems slow; it seems to postpone accomplishment  indefinitely. But in
truth a common end which is not made such by common, free voluntary cooperation in
process of achievement is common in name only. It has no support and guarantee in the
activities which it is supposed to benefit, because it is not the fruit of those activities.
Hence, it does not stay put.  It has to be continually buttressed by appeal to external, not
voluntary, considerations; bribes of pleasure, threats of harm, use of force.  It has to be
undone and done over. [Dewey and Tufts, 1908, 304]
Development agencies often have a short time horizon so they tend to interpret the purchased outward
performance as evidence for sustainable change and long-term transformation. Thus the bait and
switch theory is constantly pseudo-verified and reapplied again and again by a development agency-
much as a manager may "buy" outward obedience in the "spot market" for compliant behaviors and
then interpret that as successful organizational development or capacity-building.
12Moreover, we have noted that the attempt to buy or force transformation  with "carrots  and sticks" can
lead to the threat-to-autonomy  effect-a  negative reactance, resentment, and pushback. Dewey noted
that extrinsic incentives administered in a controlling manner would arouse the "instincts of cunning
and slyness." [1916, 26] McGregor saw that such incentives would lead to "passive acceptance" at best
and more likely to "indifference  or resistance." [1960, 68]
Eventually the reliance on external "carrots  and sticks" or "bait" can induce the atrophy effect when the
original intrinsic motivation dries up and the party becomes an aid-dependent "marionette" responding
only to external strings-a  condition perhaps approximated in some aid-dependent  countries. In this
case, the "bait-and-switch"  strategy ends up being all bait and no switch.
Nor is it only a problem in incentives. Similar problems arise concerning the cognitive (as opposed to
incentive) elements in the client country's  or doer's decision-making. The imposition of "beliefs" in the
form of "best practice" recipes can temporarily  override local judgment but will probably not lead to
any sustainable change in conviction. This carries us to the activist pedagogy and the reasons why the
Socratic guide or Deweyan teacher does not simply give the "answers"  (even assuming the "answers"
are available).
Learning is not finding out what other people already know, but is solving our own
problems for our own purposes, by questioning, thinking and testing until the solution is
a new part of our lives. [Handy 1989, 63]
Through direct observation and structured experiments,  the learner is guided to actively rediscover and
reappropriate knowledge with ownership-which at the same time will be adapted to local
circumstances. This pedagogy puts the learner in the active role, i.e., "in the driver's seat."
Theme 4 Applied: Addams-Dewey-Lasch's  Critique of Benevolence
We have focused mostly on how the help might not be autonomy-compatible  by being an imposition
that is controlling. However, there is also a "soft" form of control through "gifts," paternalism, and
benevolence that is perhaps even more insidious. 23 How can we differentiate  those forms of help that
are compatible with the autonomy of the beneficiary from those forms that are paternalistic and
controlling? John Dewey developed a critique of oppressive benevolence, and Christopher Lasch
juxtaposed the "ethic of respect" to the "ethic of compassion" [Lasch 1995].
Dewey's thinking about the controlling  aspects of paternalistic employers was prompted by the Pullman
Strike of 1894 and by the critique of Pullman's paternalism in the Chicago reformer Jane Addams'
essay "A Modern Lear" [1965], an essay that Dewey called "one of the greatest things I ever read both
as to its form and its ethical philosophy." [quoted by Lasch in Addams 1965, 176]
As its title suggests, Addams's essay was based on an extended analogy between the
relationship between King Lear and his daughter Cordelia and that of Pullman and his
workers.  Like Lear, Addams suggested, Pullman exercised a self-serving benevolence
in which he  defined the needs of those who were the objects of this benevolence in
23  In addition to being wary of "Greeks bearing gifts," Thoreau noted "If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to
my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for fear that I should have some of his good done to
me." [See Carmen 1996, 47]
13terms of his own desires and interests. Pullman built a model company town, providing
his workers with what he took to be all the necessities of life.  Like Lear, however, he
ignored one of the most important human needs, the need for autonomy. [Westbrook
1991, 89]
Jane Addams' Hull House in Chicago was one of the leading examples of settlement hout es in the turn-
of-the-century  settlement movement [see Davis 1967]. The settlement workers by living with and
working with the poor tried to use an ethic of respect in contrast to the ethic of benevolerce
exemplified by the charity organizations of the day. Respect, starting with the self-respect of the poor,
is related to their working to improve their own affairs, not being a target for "betterment."
Self-respect arises only out of people who play an active role in solving their own crises
and who are not helpless, passive, puppet-like recipients of private or public services.
To give people help, while denying them a significant part in the action, contributes
nothing to the development of the individual. In the deepest sense it is not giving but
taking-taking  their dignity.  Denial of the opportunity for participation is the denial of
human dignity and democracy. It will not work. [Alinsky 1971, 123]
Dewey developed at some length his critique of "oppressive benevolence." According to Westbrook,
Dewey held that
self-realization was a do-it-yourself project; it was not an end that one individual could
give to  or force on another.  The truly moral man was, to be sure, interestecd  in the
welfare of others-such  an interest was essential to his own self-realization-bun: a true
interest in others lay in a desire to expand their autonomous activity, not in the desire to
render them the dependent objects of charitable benevolence. [Westbrook 1991, 46-7]
Too often social workers and reformers treated the poor as an inert or wayward mass to be improved or
bettered. An incapacity for beneficial self-activity was assumed to be part of the poor's condition so
reformers would treat them accordingly.
The conception of conferring the good upon others, or at least attaining it for them,
which  is our  inheritance from the aristocratic civilization of the past, is  so deeply
embodied in religious, political, and charitable institutions and in moral teachings, that
it dies hard. Many a man, feeling himself justified by the social character of his ultimate
aim  (it  may  be  economic, or  educational, or  political), is  genuinely confutsed or
exasperated by the increasing antagonism and resentment which he evokes, because he
has not enlisted in his pursuit of the "common" end the freely cooperative activities of
others.  [Dewey and Tufts 1908, 303-4]
Aid granted out of benevolence without "carrots and sticks" has the adverse effect of reinforcing the
lack of self-confidence and doubts about one's own efficacy. Eleemosynary  aid to relieve the
symptoms may create a "moral hazard" situation to weaken reform incentives and attenuate efforts for
positive change [see Maren 1997]. "It tends to render others dependent, and thus contradicts its own
professed aim: the helping of others." [Dewey  and Tufts 1908, 387] This is the self-reinforcing cycle
14of "tutelage" 24 and dependency. Thus an autonomy-compatible  interaction would work to establish the
conditions "which permit others freely to exercise their own powers from their initiative, reflection,
and choice." [Dewey and Tufts 1908, 302]
The best kind of help to others, whenever possible, is indirect, and consists in such
modifications of the conditions of life, of the general level of subsistence, as enables
them independently to help themselves. [Dewey  and Tufts, 1908, 390125
Otherwise the prayer of a freeman would be to be left alone, and to be delivered, above
all, from "reformers" and "kind" people. [Dewey 1957, 270]
This problem suggests the possibility that the post-WWII  development assistance effort from the
developed countries to the developing world has created a massive generalized moral hazard problem
(quite aside from any non-benevolent self-serving  motives of the developed countries). Surely the
Marshall Plan, in many ways, provided a model for later development efforts. Yet it too contained  the
seeds of moral hazard. Robert Marjolin, the French architect of the Marshall Plan, noted in a 1952
memo that continuing American aid could have precisely that effect.
Although American aid has been a necessary  remedy over a period, and will continue to
be for a time, one is bound to acknowledge that in the long run it has had dangerous
psychological and  political  effects.  ... It  is  making more  difficult the  task  of the
governments of western Europe trying to bring about a thorough economic and financial
rehabilitation.  The idea that it is always possible to call on American aid, that here is
the ever-present cure for external payments deficits, is a factor destructive of willpower.
It is difficult to hope that, while this recourse continues to exist, the nations of western
Europe will  apply, for  a  sufficient length of  time,  the  courageous economic and
financial policy that will enable them to meet their needs from their own resources
without the contribution of external aid. [Quoted in: Marjolin 1989, 241]
Fortunately the demands made by the Korean War resulted in the winding down of American aid. If
the industrial countries of western Europe faced moral hazard problems in the short-lived Marshall
Plan, one can understand the extent of the moral hazard problem in developing countries that face well-
established professional aid-providers in the developed countries who need to constantly reinvent ways
to "move the money" to justify their own jobs with the accompanying  prestige, salary, and benefits.
Theme 5 Applied: Applying An Activist Philosophy of Social Learning
This central theme of "country in the driver's seat" results from applying the activist philosophy of
education to social learning. Instead of being externally imposed, transformation can only come from
within as a result of activities carried out by an individual-or  a larger organization, government, or
24 In 1784,  Immanual  Kant wrote a short but influential pamphlet What is Enlightenment? "Enlightenment  is man's release
from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding  without direction from another.
Self-incurred  is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without
direction from another. Sapere aude! 'Have the courage to use your own reason!'-that  is the motto of enlightenment."  [See
Schmidt 1996]
25 This is perhaps the best one-sentence version of helping theory. All quotations from Dewey and Tufts [19081 are from
the chapters written by Dewey.
15country. Thus any intervention on the part of the development agency should be autonomv-compatible.
While compliant behavior can be elicited from the outside, a country must "be in the driver's seat" in
order to undergo a sustainable transformation. Similarly, "ownership"  of an outcome comes from the
outcome being the fruits of the activities of the individual, organization, or country, not from being a
gift or an imposition. 26 Development assistance should focus on changing  the institutional matrix of
policy-making (i.e., the local "intrinsic motivation") which is a more subtle and longer tern affair,
indeed a "by-product of other actions." Social learning resulting from an active learning strategy will
cut deeper into the institutional matrix than will passively acquired doctrines.
If the client country should take the initiative and be in the driver's seat then how should a development
agency initiate a project? One strategy  is expressed in Schumacher's favorite slogan "Find out what the
people are doing and help them to do it better" or in the slogan "Only  jump on board moving trains."
Look for the positive changes already starting to take place in the underlying institutions (a "moving
train") and then apply development incentives ("jump on board") to strengthen those pre-existing
tendencies. The development aid should not be controlling in the sense that the train should be moving
anyway (i.e., by virtue of the country's  "own motivation"). That is, the "moving  train" should not be
extrinsically motivated as a means to get the aid. If no trains are moving, then motion induced by
"bribes" is unlikely to transform the underlying institutions.
There is a real danger that a development  intervention, instead of acting as a catalyst or midwife to
empower change in an autonomy-compatible  manner, will only short-circuit  people's learning
activities and reinforce their feelings of impotence. The external incentives may temporarily
overpower the springs of action that are native to the institutional matrix of the country, but that will
probably not induce any lasting institutional reforms.  As these reforms were extemally imposed rather
than actively appropriated by the country, there would be little "ownership"  of the reforms.
Compliance might be only perfunctory;  the "quick" transplant might soon wither and die---to then be
reinstalled" in an "improved" form by the next generation of agency task managers.
Knowledge-Based  Development  Assistance:  Methodology
The Standard  Theory-in-Use
The problem is that of a development agency trying to help some group, the "doers of development," 27
in need of development assistance (e.g., policy-makers and government officials in a developing
country). The agency is attempting to provide knowledge-based  assistance (in contrast to only
financial or material aid). One prominent case in point is the vision of the World Bank operating as a
knowledge bank.
26 Success for a leader or, in general, a helper may be paradoxical in the sense that the helper creates the situation where the
doers take success as their own accomplishment  [see Edmunson 1999 for a practical overview of such paradoxes].  Charles
Handy notes these results after the doers internalize the activity as their own. "Internalization ... means that the individual
recipient of influence adopts the idea, the change in attitude or the new behaviour, as his own. Fine.  He will act on it
without pressure. The change will be self-maintaining  to a high degree. ... The successful  psychotherapist is the one whose
patients all believe they cured themselves-they  internalized the therapy and it thereby became truly an integral part of
them. Consultants suffer much the same  dilemma of the psychotherapist-the  problem of internalization. If they wish the
client to use the right solution with full and lasting commitment  then they must let him believe it is his  solution." [1993,
145]  This echoes the notion of the Taoist ruler who governs in such a way that when the task is accomplished, the people
will say "We have done it ourselves." [Lao-Tzu, Te-Tao Ching,  Ch. 17]
27  See Wolfensohn 1999.
16The main problem in knowledge-based development  assistance is the standard, default, or naive
theory-in-use (regardless of the "espoused theory")  that the agency has "development  knowledge" in
the form of answers that need to be taught, transmitted, and transferred to the target population of
trainees. That methodology is taken as so obvious that the focus is simply on how to "deliver" the
knowledge,  how to "scale up" the knowledge transmission in the client country, and how to measure
and evaluate the impact of these efforts.
This "standard view" of knowledge-based development assistance is based on the pedagogy  which sees
the learners as essentially passive containers into which "knowledge"  is poured. It is the theory that
Paulo Freire called the "banking"  theory since teaching was seen as depositing knowledge into a bank
account [1970]. The standard theory is also captured by the old Chinese metaphor of help as "giving
out fish."
Ownership Problems
In accordance  with the principle of people owning the fruits of their labor, the doers will have
ownership when they are in the driver's seat (indeed, the description as "doers" would not be accurate if
they had a passive role). In the standard view of knowledge-based  assistance, the helpers are teachers
or trainers taking the active role to transmit "knowledge  for development"  to the passive but grateful
clients. "Development"  is seen almost as a technical process like building an airport or dam with the
agency having "technical social engineering  knowledge"  to be transmitted to the clients.
Since this "knowledge  for development" is offered below cost or for free as a "global public good," it is
quite tempting for the developing countries to accept this sort of knowledge-based development
assistance. There are even positive incentives such as extensive travel, pleasant accommodations,
generous per diems, salary supplements, and other vacation-like  benefits offered to those who
cooperate to undergo the training. From the supply side of training, management pushes task managers
to "show results"-particularly  results that can be observed and evaluated back at headquarters (such as
the head count in training programs). The task managers need to show that they have "given out a
certain number of fish" or, even better, that they have helped set up a "fish distribution system" to scale
up the delivery of the knowledge to the client country. Thus the managers need to "take ownership"  of
the process of assistance in order to "show results" and the clients are agreeably induced to go along. 28
This is tutelage, not active learning; it develops dependency,  not autonomy or self-direction.
Self-Efficacy Problems
The standard view of delivering knowledge for development leads to an impairment in the self-
confidence, self-esteem,  and self-efficacy of the clients. The message behind the "main messages" is
that the clients are unable to organize their own learning process and to find out these things in their
own way.  They need to be "helped"-to  be shown the way. But the way in which the standard
methodology "shows them the way" only reinforces  the clients' passivity and perceived lack of self-
efficacy.
28  McClintock [1982]  tells the story in a broader historical context that "as passionate causes wracked human
affairs  .. people found it hard to maintain restraint, they ceased to be willing merely  to help in the self development of their
fellows; they discovered themselves burdened, alas, with paternal responsibility  for ensuring that their wards would not
falter and miss the mark...  .Pressures-religious, political, social, economic, humanitarian  pressures-began to mount upon the
schools, and it soon became a mere matter of time before schools would be held accountable for the people they produced."
[60; quoted in Candy 1991, 32]
17Economists  think of an "externality"  as an effect that one party has on another  outside  of a market
interaction.  But there is another use of the word  "externality"  in psychology that is also re evant.
"Externality"  is the psychological  condition  of seeing whatever happens  to oneself as havi ng external
causes.  The locus of control over one's life is external; one's own actions are seen as being  ineffectual.
At best, there is only a highly circumscribed  sphere of personal or mental life where one nr  ight be able
to exercise  some internal  locus of control.  Externality  leads to a condition  of learned help  essness,
apathy, and fatalism.  In contrast,  "internality" is the condition  of seeing one's actions as having  a real
effect-of  having an internal  locus of control over what happens  to oneself. 29
The conditions  of externality  and internality each tend to be self-reinforcing.  Externality  [leads  to
resignation  and fatalism  so individuals  will not make a concerted  effort to change their con-dition, little
will thus change, and their fatalism will be confirmed  in a continuing  vicious  circle.  If, however,
individuals  believe  their efforts will make a difference,  then they are more likely to make  a concerted
effort and thus they are more likely to succeed  so their internality may be confirmed  in a v  rtuous
circle.
The poor already have a history of ineffectual  action to better their condition,  so any kind of assistance
that reinforces  that perceived  inability to help themselves  is simply the wrong kind of assistance,  no
matter how  "well-intended."
Cognitive  Dependency  Problems
Self-efficacy  or the lack of it is usually considered  as a matter of volition but a similar prollem  arises
with cognition.  A party might  lack self-confidence  in their own intelligence, judgment,  ar!d other
cognitive  skills in addition to lacking self-confidence  about the efficacy of their actions.  In an extreme
state of dependency,  they might be like a marionette  not only in their "actions" but also in their
opinions,  views, and "knowledge."  This cognitive  aspect of dependence  is clearly  very relevant  to
understanding  the detrimental  forms of "knowledge-based  development  assistance."
With the standard methodology  of knowledge-based  assistance,  the "best learners" are often the most
marionette-like  (or perhaps simply the most ambitious) trainees who quickly learn the new jargon  to
parrot the main  messages.  Those  "best learners" are then qualified to staff the local missions  or
missionary  outposts that are the staging  areas and repeater stations for scaling up the transmission  of
the main messages  to others in the target  population-all  in the name of "capacity building."  Those
local mission  organizations  might also be the gatekeepers  for other aid and resources  flow/  Ing from the
development  agency to the client country.
The cognitively  dependent  recipients  of the main messages  will also play a role in perpetu3lting the
dynamics of stifling critical reason  in favor of bureaucratic  "reason" in the development  agencies.  As
such clients  have become cognitively  dependent,  they would be distressed if they should  lear  the
"authorities"  arguing among  themselves  about "development  knowledge"  and development  strategies.
They are accustomed  to being told the "best practices"  to follow, so it weakens  their faith  1  n the
prestigious  authorities  with the global purview  to determine  "best practices"  if there is an)  public
disagreement.  How can the patient  have faith in the doctors if the patient  is exposed  to arguments
among  the doctors  about the best treatment?
29  See Chapter  14 on "Localness"  in Senge  1990;  Chapter  9 on "Self-attribution:  market  influences"  in Lane  1991; or
Bandura  1995.
18Moral Hazard  Problems
The problem of reinforcing a perceived lack of cognitive  and volitional self-efficacy  is closely related
to what are called the "moral hazard" aspects of traditional aid and charity. The possibility of moral
hazard arises when people are shielded from the effects of their own actions as when over-insurance
leads people to act carelessly failing to take normal precautions.
Benevolent charity in the form of knowledge-based  assistance as well as other forms of charity softens
the incentives for people to help themselves. If one analogizes between "taking normal precautions to
prevent accidents" and "taking normal actions to help oneself' then morally hazardous over-insurance
is analogous to forms of assistance that soften the incentives of self-activity and impair autonomy. In
the insurance example, the limit case of no insurance (which means complete self-insurance) certainly
"solves"  the problem of moral hazard since the individual  then has full incentives  to take precautions to
prevent accidents. Yet the "no insurance" option is not optimal; it amounts to throwing out the baby of
risk pooling and diversification in order to get rid of the bathwater of moral hazard. Nor is there any
first best solution of complete insurance without moral hazard. There are partial solutions in the form
of co-payments and deductibles so that the insured party retains some risk and thus incentive to take
normal precautions.
In a similar manner, the extreme of "no assistance" could be seen as the limit case of autonomy-
compatible assistance. It certainly "solves"  the problem of softened incentives for self-help but it
foregoes forms of positive assistance that might be autonomy-compatible. The idea of co-payments
carries over to the idea of partially matching funds from the clients as a commitment  mechanism to
show that they are committed on their own account to the learning programs. The idea of deductibles
carries over to the concept of second-stage funding where the doer shows commitment by funding the
first stage of a project.
Types of Development  Knowledge
Universal  versus  Local Knowledge
So far the focus has been on the standard methodology of knowledge-based  assistance (transmitting
development  knowledge from agency to clients) and how that methodology undercuts the ownership,
self-efficacy,  self-direction, and capacity-building  efforts of the developing countries. The standard
methodology is, however, also flawed in its implicit assumptions about the nature of crucial
development knowledge.
Can a money bank also function as a "knowledge  bank"? Money travels better than knowledge.
General knowledge is knowledge that holds across countries, cultures, and times; local knowledge
takes account of the specifics of place, people, and time. "Every  man is mortal" is general knowledge,
while "Every  vegetarian is a foreigner" is local knowledge  in Mongolia. A "best practice" might work
well in some countries but fail miserably when recommended in other contexts. One size may not fit
all. In questions of institutional development, it is very difficult to know a priori  just how general is a
"best practice." Global "best practices" usually need to be locally reinvented.
The significance of this point of view is that contrary to the simplistic use of the term by
many economists, there is, in principle, no such thing as diffusion of best practice.  At
best, there is only the diffusion of best practices, practices that evolve in the course of
19their diffusion.  Contrary to popular wisdom,  there are times  when it pays to reinvent  the
wheel!  [Cole  1989, 117]
Prudent  counsel  is to scan globally for best practices  but to test them locally since local adaptation
often  amounts to reinventing  the "best practice" in the new context.  Scan globally; reinvent  locally.
Many foreign  experts  have painfully discovered  that the "devil is in the (local) details."  It .s the local
component  of knowledge  that requires adaptation-which  in turn requires the active participation  of
those who know  and understand  the local environment.  Local  adaptation  cannot be done by the
passive  cognitively  dependent recipients  of "developmen-t knowledge":  it must be done by the "doers of
development"  in the course  of their self-activity.
There  are two points here that need to be teased apart: the necessity that knowledge  be made locally
applicable  and that the adaptation  be done by the local "doers of development"  (not given as a gift or
imposed  as a conditionality  from the outside).  It is by the local selection,  assimilation,  and adaptation
of knowledge  that local doers "make it their own."  Even by taking a machine or device  apart  and
putting it back together  again, one can more "make it one's own" even if there is little adaptation  or
redesign.  Thus  it is not a matter of being "open" or "closed" to outside  knowledge  (as in much  of the
globalization  debate); it is a matter of being open to outside knowledge  in a way that reaffirms  one's
autonomy.  For Gandhi, this was intellectual  swara; (self-rule  or autonomy).  "I do not want my house
to be walled  in on all sides and my windows  to be stuffed.  I want the cultures  of all lands to be blown
about my house  as freely as possible.  But I refuse  to be blown off my feet"  [Quoted in Datta  1961,
120]  Only by remaining  "on one's feet" from an intellectual  standpoint  can the local doers have  the
self-confidence  to select, assimilate,  and adapt the external knowledge-instead  of being overwhelmed
and rendered  intellectually  dependent  and subservient.
Considerable  effort is required  to adapt development  knowledge  to local conditions  and culture.  Policy
research  institutes  (think tanks) are examples  of local institutions  that can play that important  role.  In
the developed  countries,  think tanks have proliferated  and have become important  agents t3 introduce
and adapt new policy initiatives.  Think tanks or similar research institutions  are no less needed to
transplant  social innovations  to new contexts.  The Japanese use a metaphor based  on the gardening
technique  called nemawashi  of slowly preparing  and wrapping  each root of a tree in order to transplant
it. 30 The chances  of a successful  transplant are much larger than if the tree is pulled up in one place and
planted  in another.
When advocating  a certain type of organization  (e.g.. local policy research  institutes),  it is necessary to
indicate what is not being advocated.  In the relationship  between the center (e.g., multilateral
development  agency)  and the periphery  (e.g., developing  country),  there may be certain organizations
in the local country that are "legitimized"  not by their role in the country but by their  role as local
gatekeeper  for the central  authority.  The center judges  the local organization  by its ability to faithfully
clone or parrot  the "universal" messages  from the center, not by the organization's  ability to adapt  the
experiences  of others to the local situation  and to thus earn an embedded  legitimacy  in the country.
If anyone  in the center should doubt the applicability  of the central  messages, then the local
accommodating  elite will always be more than willing to supply positive  "local feedback"  about the
applicability  of the central  messages-which  also serves to vouchsafe  the intermediary  role of the local
30  See Morita 1986, 158.
20counterpart elite as "gatekeepers"  for the resources and influence  emanating from the center. This
mutual reinforcement locks in the relationship so the center ends up having little transformative effect
on the more embedded and indigenous local structures,  all the while receiving positive feedback on
"the wonderful  job it is doing." In some cases, the international  agency even hires (directly or through
the local counterpart) a public relations firm to publicize "Potemkin villages" so that the rest of the
world will also hear about "the wonderful job it is doing."
Those in the center who are legitimated in their expertise, prestige, and privileges by the "universality"
of their messages are disinclined to recognize limitations or subtleties in the local applicability of their
"technical expertise." Novel complexity, genuine uncertainty, conflict of values, unique circumstances,
and structural instabilities are all down played or ignored since they might diminish the perceived
potency of the center's expertise and undercut the client's faith in that potency. The client often wants
the child-like security and comfort of being in the hands of the professional expert who will solve the
perplexing problems. 3"  Thus the center and periphery may well agree on establishing a "transmission
belt" between the "wholesale"  source and the local "retailers"  for all the universal expert messages and
best practice recipes, i.e., the standard knowledge-transmission  methodology. These are some of the
strong institutional forces to under-appreciate  the subtleties of local knowledge, to hamper the growth
of autonomous client ownership, and to stymie the development of indigenous local knowledge
institutions.
Codified versus Tacit Knowledge
Explicit or codified knowledge is knowledge that can be spoken, written, and codified to be saved on a
computer disk or transmitted over a telephone line. But we know more than we can say. We know
how to ride a bike, to recognize a face, or to tell a grammatical sentence in our native language, but we
would be hard put to turn this knowledge into explicit or codified knowledge  to archive in a database
for dissemination over the Internet. Michael Polanyi [1962] pioneered the distinction between tacit (or
personal) and explicit knowledge in philosophy of science, and the distinction has since proven
important to understand problems in the transfer of technologies,  not to mention the "transfer"  of
institutions. 32
There is much more to a technological system than can be put in an instruction book. The same holds
afortiori  for "social technologies" or institutions. In a codified description of a "best practice" case
study, the uncodified tacit knowledge is often "the rest of the iceberg." 33 Some tacit knowledge might
be transformed into codified knowledge [see Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995] so that it could be transferred
by conventional methods. But the remaining tacit knowledge  needs to be transmitted by special
methods such as apprenticeship, secondments, imitation, twinning relations, and guided learning-by-
doing.  These methods of transferring tacit knowledge  will be called "horizontal"  methods of
knowledge transfer-in contrast to "vertical" methods where knowledge can be codified, transmitted to
a central repository or library, and then retransmitted to students.
31  See Schon's treatment [1983] of the technical expert in contrast with reflective practitioner.
32 See Ryle 1945-6 for the earlier distinction between knowing  how and knowing  that, Oakeshott 1991 for a treatment of
practical knowledge versus  technical knowledge, Schon 1983 for a related treatment of professional versus instrumental
knowledge, Marglin 1990 on techne versus episteme, and Scott 1998 on metis versus episteme/techne (see p. 425 on the
terminological differences with Marglin's usage).
33  Even the codified part may suffer from the "Rashomon effect" described in Schon 1971.
21The tacit component in local or general development knowledge is best learned through "horizontal"
methods such as study tours, cross-training, and twinning. International development agencies have
the perspective to know the success stories and thus to fruitfully play a match-making, facilitating, and
brokering role in horizontal learning-not a training role.
Implications for "Knowledge  Bank" as Storehouse or as Brokerage
A development agency as a knowledge bank faces a choice; should it pursue the library-storehouse
model or the knowledge-brokerage  model? In the brokerage model, knowledge still needs to be
catalogued but it is primarily the second-order  knowledge  of where to find the how-to knciwledge. To
analogize with web terminology,  the storehouse model stores the documents while the broker model
stores the pointers. Since the storehouse model focuses on documents, it specializes in codified
knowledge available at the agency while the broker model focuses on codified pointers to sources of
knowledge and experience (which could be codified or tacit) throughout the world (including the
agency itself). In terms of pedagogy, the storehouse model sees the agency as the teacher transferring
knowledge from its storehouse to the passive student/client. The broker model sees the client in the
more active role of scanning for knowledge and relevant experience, and the agency in the more
intermediary midwife role of assisting in that search  by helping to frame the questions and apply
experience in locating relevant sources.
The difference between the models should not be overdrawn. The storehouse model would not
suppress other knowledge sources or rule out referrals, but there is a very real difference in emphasis.
It will make considerable difference which model is the actual working model providing the strategic
direction for the development agency as a knowledge bank. But the approach of bureaucratic reason is
to "do both models" and thus to poorly implement the difficult brokerage model which does not glorify
the role of "experts" in the center.
As the information revolution rolls into the 21 "t  century, codified knowledge will more and more
approximate the theoretical limit of a free non-rivalrous good. Clients will have access to vast
storehouses of codified knowledge, and the agency's own storehouse will increasingly pale in
comparison. The scarce knowledge will be that of the reflective and experienced practitioners
wherever they are around the world. On the broker model, the knowledge bank would be a central
clearing  house in that subtle form of professional  expertise (which cannot be downloaded over a phone
line). It would play a key global role in putting those who have acquired practical development
knowledge at the disposal of those who are willing and able to learn.
Knowledge-Based  Development  Organizations
Introduction: A "Church"  versus a Learning Organization
In the modern world it is now commonplace to accent the importance of "intellectual capital" and
"knowledge  management." Most organizations want to be seen as "learning organizations." Yet many
old habits persist that are directly opposed to learning and to the advancement of knowledge. The new
rhetoric of "learning" is applied as a veneer onto a church-like or Party-like organization proselytizing
its own messages.
We have so far considered questions about the methodology of knowledge-based  development
assistance and the subtleties introduced by different types of development knowledge. Now we focus
22on the organization or agency involved in knowledge-based development assistance. 34 How can such
an agency function as a learning organization? The question will be approached by considering some
of the major roadblocks in the way of organizational learning.
Roadblock to Learning #1: Branded Knowledge as Dogma
To put it simply, the basic problem is that in spite of the espoused model of a "learning organization,"
the theory-in-use of a development agency is often a model of a "development church" giving
definitive ex cathedra "views" on all the substantive questions. As with the dogmas of a church,  the
brand name of the organization is invested in its views. Once an "Official Agency View" has been
announced (substitute for "Agency"  the name of the relevant development institution), then to question
an Agency View is an attack on the Agency itself and on the value of its franchise, so new learning at
the cost of old Agency Views is not encouraged.  Thus when licensing an Agency View, the
authorities need to have what Milton called the "grace of infallibility and incorruptibleness" 35 since any
subsequent "learning"  would be tantamount to disloyalty.
When the Agency takes Official Views, then the discussion between the agency staff and the clients is
a pseudo-dialogue since the agency staff are not free to unilaterally  change Official Views (just as
missionaries are not free to approve local variations in Church dogmas) or to get a project approved
that departs substantially  from those views.  The slogan is something like: "Give the clients an inch of
nuance, and they'll take a mile of status quo." [Kanbur and Vines 2000, 101] The clients are like Henry
Ford's Model T customers who were free to choose any color so long as it was black. The clients who
wish to receive assistance are free to "learn" and to "make up their own minds" so long as they do so in
conformity with Official Views.
There is little motivation for the staff to actively appropriate  or understand any deeper rationale for the
Views since they must espouse the Official Views to the clients in any case. The views are generally
not those that the individual staff members individually decided upon based on evidence or
argumentation. In project design, the herd instinct takes over. If a project manager designs a project in
conformity with Official Views and the project fails, then the individual could hardly be faulted for
being a good team player.
Debate by agency staff publicly aired outside the agency on its Official Views is to be frowned upon.
The reasoning is standard: parents should not argue in front of the children; doctors should not debate
in front of the patients. There can be debate within the confines of the Party but when a decision is
made, then the members must publicly adhere to the Party Line. The church or Party model fits
perfectly with the standard "dissemination"  or transmission belt methodology of knowledge-based
development assistance. The agency has the best "knowledge  for development" and it is to be
transmitted through various forms of aid-baited proselytization  to the authorities in the developing
world.
What is the alternative "ecology  of knowledge"? The organization  of science provides the paradigm
example where the open and public contestation of ideas and criticism of conjectures is essential.
Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it
makes us understand the difficulties of the problem which we are trying to solve.  This
34  See also Ellerman 1999.
3  See Morley  1928, 218.
23is  how we become better acquainted with our problems, and  able to propose more
mature  solutions: the  very refutation of a  theory-that  is,  of  any  serious tentative
solution to our problem-is  always a step forward that takes us nearer to the truth....
Since none of [the theories] can be positively justified, it is essentially their critical and
progressive character-the  fact that  we  can  argue  about their  claim to  solve  our
problems better than their competitors-which  constitutes the rationality of science.
[Popper 1965, vii]
"[A]mong contemporary social arrangements  the modem Western university is the main one that has
endeavored to make intellectual criticism and innovation a legitimate and regular aspect of the
prevailing social order." [Moore 1972, 91] The university does not set itself up as an arbiter of truth,
but as an arena within which contrary theories can be examined and can collide in open debate. The
organization does not itself have Official Views or "messages"  on the questions of the day-and  thus it
does not need a special department to monitor and control the propagating of Official Views.
When an agency takes Official Views on questions or considers its views as branded knowledge, then
the genuine collision of adverse opinions and the rule of critical reason will tend to give way to the rule
of authority and bureaucratic reason within the hierarchy of the organization (e.g., the "Soviet Theory
of Genetics" or the "University  of Utah Theory of Cold Fusion"). The authorities in the organization
naturally decide the Official Views of the organization  and would tend to shut off or "embargo" any
feedback loops that might question the previous "Official Views" and thus might subtract from the
"franchise value" of the "brand name." Learning from errors which involves changing "Official Views"
and modifying "branded knowledge"  is minimized so the organization tends to function more as a
secular church than as an open learning organization-regardless of the espoused theory.
The church/Party model of proselytizing directly  contradicts autonomous or self-directed learning in
the client countries. The project manager from the agency wants the clients to "learn" so long as they
learn "the right thing." The gardener wants only her own seeds to grow; all else are weeds. Any
genuinely self-directed learning process in the client country might veer off in the "wrong direction"
which the project manager could not support. The project manager would return to headquarters as a
failure without a project. Therefore the flow of knowledge must be managed. The clients must be kept
from being distracted by non-sanctioned opinions. The standard transmission-belt methodology of
dissemination is thus a corollary of the church/Party model.
Roadblock to Learning #2: Funded Assumptions as Dogma
Why is it so necessary for a development agency to take an Official View on the One Best Way to
solve a development problem?  One common answer is that a development agency is not a university;
the agency puts money as loans or grants behind projects based on various assumptions. University
professors do not "put their money where their mouth is" so they are free to debate questions forever.
Once an agency has committed significant resources to certain assumptions, then it is time to "fall in
line" and support the funded assumption.
There are obvious bureaucratic reasons why individual project managers and their superiors would like
a funded project assumption to be treated as "gospel"  but they are not reasons why the whole institution
24should take such a stand.  The commitment of funds and prestige even seems to alter perceptions. 36 For
instance, subjective assessments of winning probabilities tend to increase after bettors at a race track
have placed their bets.  But horses do not run faster when bets are riding on them. Theories are
corroborated by evidence, not by commitments of funds. Many businesses have come to grief because
managers would not revisit strategies after initial costs were sunk. In view of the record of
international development aid, there is little support for the similar practice of seeing project
assumptions as hardening into gospel because of the commitment of funds.
Roadblock  to Learning  #3: "Social Science"  as Dogma
Today, "science" has long since replaced religious authority (the "Church") as the source of dogmas
that one can appeal to without further reason or corroboration. That style of argumentation completely
misrepresents the scientific method, not to mention the role of critical reason, but it is none the less
quite common. The all-too-human factors that previously led to an appeal to church dogma have not
suddenly disappeared in today's scientific age so one should expect the appeal to "science" to be
thoroughly abused.  This is nowhere more true than in the social sciences [see Andreski 1972].
Economics is the "rooster ruling the roost" in the social sciences, so one should expect much to be
passed off in the name of "economics." Yet many of the theses imposed by bureaucratic power as the
"Truths of Economics" would not pass without serious challenge in any open scientific forum-
particularly when one goes beyond academic model building to policy applications. 37
It is particularly unfortunate when a Tayloristic "One Best Way" (OBW) mentality creeps into
development policy-making in the name of "science." The problems of the developing and transition
countries are much too complex to yield to formulaic "best practices" and "magic bullets." Many
different approaches need to be tried on an experimental basis, so when a major development agency
stakes its reputation on the "One Best Way"  then the development effort as a whole is impoverished.
Roadblock  to Learning  #4: The Rage to Conclude
Hirschman has often noted the problems created in developing countries by the tendency that Flaubert
ridiculed as la rage de vouloir conclure or the rage to conclude. 38 But the same attitude is rampant in
development agencies. Indeed, this is another self-reinforcing  lock-in between development agencies
and their client countries.
[Policy-makers] will be  supplied with  a  great many ideas, suggestions, plans,  and
ideologies,  frequently of  foreign origin or  based  on foreign experience....Genuine
learning about the problem will sometimes be prevented not only by the local policy-
makers' eagerness to jump to a ready-made solution but also by the insistent offer of
help and advice on the part of powerful outsiders....  [S]uch practices [will] tend to cut
short that "long confrontation between man and a situation" (Camus) so fruitful for the
achievement of genuine progress in problem-solving. [Hirschman 1973, 239-40]
36  When predictions fail, then skewed perceptions and rationalizations are a likely outcome. See Festinger et al. 1956,
Festinger 1957, Part It in Lane 1991,  and Elster 1983. See Akerlof and Dickens 1982 for an economic treatment of
cognitive dissonance.
37  One example that springs to mind is the role in the Russian  reform debacle of the Harvard economic wunderkinder  and
the western agencies all of whom "of course" knew how to "install" the institutions of a market economy.
38  See Hirschman 1973,  238-40.
25The questions  that face development  agencies  about inducing economic  and social development  are
perhaps the most complex  and ill-defined  questions  facing humankind.  Donald  Schon  [11971,  1983]
noted the novel complexity,  genuine  uncertainty,  conflict of values,  unique  circumstances,  and
structural  instabilities  that plague  such problems  of social transformation  and that precluci  definitive
blueprint  solutions.  Yet one must marvel at the tendency  of the major development  agencies to rush
forward  with universal 39 "best practices"-a  tendency based not on any methods  resembling  social
science but on a bureaucratic  need to maintain  elite prestige by "having an answer"  for the client.  In
contrast,  every field of science is populated  by competing theories,  and scientists do not f-eel  the need to
artificially  rush  to closure just  to "have an answer."
Consider,  for example,  the complex  problem of fighting corruption.  Economists  might  approach the
topic  by trying to minimize  government-imposed  discretionary  regulations  which  present  rent-seeking
opportunities  to officials  who might offer to relax a restriction  for appropriate  consideratiin.
Accountants  might emphasize  transparency  and uniformity of data and the independence  of auditing.
Civil  servants  might emphasize  codes  of ethics, organizational  morale,  and disclosure  req uirements.
Lawyers  might encourage  civil discovery  procedures  and criminal  sanctions.  Others will  promote a
free and independent  press, a high standard of public  ethics, and a vigorous civil  society.  There  are
clearly  many ways to approach the topic and there seems to be no One Best Way so a multi-pronged
approach seems  advisable.  Yet the dogmatic  mentality might express  alarm  and dismay  when different
groups  from an international  development  agency take different  approaches  to fighting  corruption  and
these  different  views are aired at international  conferences.  Why can't the international  agency "get its
act together"  and tell the client the One Best Way to address the problem?
When journalists  try to "build a story" by pointing out differences  within a development  agency, then
agency bureaucrats  should point out to the opportunistic journalists  the necessity  of the open clash of
adverse  opinions  to intellectual  advance  (with references to Mill's On Liberty).  They sho .ld  point out
that the real story is the intellectual  honesty  and integrity of an agency that would have  such open
discussions  that are the lifeblood  of intellectual  and scientific progress.  Instead PR-oriented
bureaucrats  are more typically  alarmed at the lack of "coordination  of messages"  and rededicate
themselves  to better vetting  the public statements  of agency officials  and researchers,  a tragi-comic
effort usually carried out in the name  of "quality control."  How can the passive dependent  clients  put
themselves  in the hands of the international  experts  if the latter cannot agree on the One lBest Way to
fight corruption  or to address other complex  development  issues?
The church  approach has implications  for the question of client-centered  versus  paternalistic
approaches  to client learning.  What would  be "wrong" with two different  parts of an international
development  institution  expressing  at an international  conference two different  views  on a complex
question?  What would be "wrong" with the listeners or readers realizing  that affiliation  with an elite
institution  is not the touchstone  of truth just  as publication  in an elite journal  is not the inmprimatur of
infallibility?  Indeed, such a realization  might  have the rather positive  effect  of leading  the listeners  or
readers  to think the matter over themselves  and thus to take some responsibility  in forming  an opinion
for themselves.40 In short, it would  foster active learning rather than promote  passive  acceptance  of the
39 The universal  suggestion  that everyone  wears a three-piece  suit still requires  local tailoring  or adaptatior.  to each  person's
size and shape-and  this is the fallacy  in the argument that  an agency  does not recommend  a "universal  recipe"  because  it
recognizes  the need to local adaptation.
40 Some of the best computer-based  training  programs  have "experts"  popping  up on the screen  giving contradictory  advice.
"In other words, the program  communicates  that there's  not always one right answer.  It invites trainees  to learn to use their
26"truth" promulgated by a church-like organization. Why should the organizations so fear such an
outcome all in the name of "quality control"?
Often the argument is that "Yes, there are doubts and differences within the Agency, but the Agency
must show a united front in order to steel the resolve of the clients trying to implement a difficult
program of social and economic change." Perhaps the clear resolve of the Agency's Official View and
the possibility of aid conditioned on acceptance  of that View will tip the domestic balance in a
developing country and bring the internal advocates of that view to power. Firstly, this argument
implicitly assumes a Jacobinic (or market-Bolshevik)  rather than adaptive and experimentalist strategy
of change. Yes, a Jacobinic strategy does assume a fanatical resolve that cannot publicly entertain
doubts, but that is one of the many problems with that philosophy of social change. An adaptive,
experimentalist, or pragmatic approach requires no such certitude and indeed it welcomes a variety of
parallel experiments in various regions or sectors to see what works (e.g., as in the Chinese reforms). 4
Secondly,  this argument assumes that the government is deriving its reform motivation from the
Agency, not from within-an  assumption  that by now requires no further comment. Thirdly, while
Hirschman notes that this imagined sequence is not impossible, "it is our conviction  that this picture of
program aid as a catalyst for virtuous policies belongs to the realm of rhapsodic phantasy." [1971, 205]
The Open Learning Model
Surely much has been learned about economic development. What is wrong with espousing the best
practices from successful development as well as promoting the underlying guiding principles? Should
international development organizations  just be agnostic on the questions of development and treat all
opinions as having equal weight? To approach these questions, it is useful to consider the
methodology of science. Science as a loosely structured international open learning organization is
hardly agnostic in any given area. All opinions are not given equal weight. Certain theories are the
"received"  or current theories in a field. The difference from a "church"  lies in the methodology used
to sustain or overturn the hypotheses. In mathematics, it is proof, not authority, that is the basis for
theorems. In the empirical sciences, hypotheses are developed on the basis of intellectual coherence
and factual cues, and are then openly subjected  to experiments  that can be intersubjectively  verified
and reproduced.
This methodology of science shows, at least in general terms, how an open learning model of a
knowledge-based development agency might operate. The important thing is not to teach a client
country the "Truth" but firstly to see that the major positions on a controversial  question are presented
to a country, and secondly (of greater long-term importance) to foster the active learning methodology
within the country to find and corroborate or disprove the hypotheses and theories. That means
capacity-building in the knowledge institutions of the country. For instance, if a knowledge-based
development organization wants to promote the OBW of reforming or changing certain institutions
(e.g., the "best" model of fighting corruption or the "best" form of privatization), then it should be
willing to share the source of that "knowledge,"  to promote some experiments in the country  to
corroborate such a hypothesis or to validate a local adaptation, and to encourage horizontal cross-
learning from similar experiments documented  in the organization's knowledge management system-
own judgment rather than rely on someone else's-especially  when the someone else isn't as close to the situation as you are.
Organizations today are facing increasingly complex situations where there are many possible answers. Traditional training
that insists on right and wrong answers disempowers  the individual-it robs people of their decision-making  ability." [Schank
1997,  24]
41 See Rondinelli 1983 on an adaptive approach.
27all before the reform  is accepted as a "blueprint"  for the country as a whole.  The message  to policy-
makers  is:
To the best of our accumulated  experience  (which we deem to call  "knowledge"),  [lere is
what works  best in countries  like yours.  Why don't you study these principles  tc1gether
with  their corroboration  to date (best practice  success  stories), take a look at the, e case
studies,  contact  these  people  who  designed  those  reforms,  set  up  horizontal  learning
programs  with those  best practice  cases,  and try some experiments  to see what  \,.orks in
your own country?  After carrying out this learning  process  on your own, you mic,ht call
us  back  if  you  feel  we  could  help  by  partially  but  not  wholly  funding  the  Deform
program  you have decided upon.
The most important  thing  is to get away from the model of "teaching" as the transmission  of knowledge
from the development  agency to the developing  country.  In a slogan:  "Stop the teaching  s,o  that the
learning  can begin!"  As George Bemard  Shaw put it: "if you teach a man anything he wi  I never learn
it." [1962.  174]  Ortega  y Gasset suggested:  "He who wants to teach a truth should place  Us in the
position to discover  it ourselves."  [1961, 67]  To impose  a model without  this local learmling  process
would  be to short-circuit  and bypass the active learning  capability of the local policy-makers.  to
substitute  authority  in its place,  and thus to perpetuate  the passivity of tutelage.
Competition  and Devil's Advocacy  in the Open Learning  Model
How can a large bureaucratic  agency itself advance  from the church  model towards  an open learning
model?  One way is for the agency to take some of its own medicine in the sense of fostering
competition  in a marketplace  for ideas within the agency. 42 For instance,  the defendant's  right to an
attorney  in an American  courtroom  takes away from the prosecutor the monopoly  right tc' present
evidence and arguments.  A judge may not go to the jury before both sides of the arguments  have been
heard, and a patient  should not go to surgery before getting a second opinion.  Even the F'Roman
Catholic  Church, when  considering  someone for sainthood, has a "devil's advocate"  (Adlvscatus
Diaboli)  to state the other side of the story.  A development  agency should not pretend  to greater
authority  or infallibility  when  it canonizes  a good practice  success story as the OBW.
Thus  devil's advocacy might not only be tolerated  but fostered in a development  agency tlunctioning as
an open learning  organization. 43 The political scientist Alfred De Grazia recommends  su:h  a
countervailance  system as a part of any large bureaucracy.  "The countervailors  would be a corps of
professional  critics of all aspects of bureaucracy  who would be assigned by the representative  council
of an institution  to specialize  as critic of all the subinstitutions."  11975] This idea goes b)ack to the role
of Socrates in Athens as a gadfly.
42  This is expressed in the "marketplace of ideas concept-the proposition  that truth naturally overcomes faisehood when
they are allowed to compete.... The belief that competing voices produce superior conclusions [is]... implizit in scientific
reasoning, the practice of trial by jury, and the process of legislative debate." [Smith 1988, 31].
43  Devil's advocacy [see Schwenk 1984] is interpreted broadly to include a number  of related techniques tc better elicit thc
main policy alternatives. A Cassandra's advocate [Janis 1972, 217] is a person who emphasizes alternati' e interpretations
of data and focuses on all the things that can go wrong ("Murphy's Law-yer"). The Rashomon effect [see  ichon 1971,  2101
illustrates that the same set of circumstances  and events can be interpreted very differently by different people. Discussion
organized as a debate between the proposed policy and the best alternative has been called the dialectical method [see
Schwenk 1989; or Tung and Heminger 1993]. Multiple advocacy [Haas 1990,  210] and double visioning [see Schon 1983,
281] refers to the practice of not only allowing  but fostering the presentation of two or more policy options.
28For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a
ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, attached to the state by God; and the
state is a  great and noble horse who is rather sluggish owing to  his very size, and
requires to be stirred into life.  I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and
all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading
and reproaching you. [Apology,  30-1]
Devil's advocacy might provide a constructive alternative  in addition to negative criticism of the
proposed policy. In economics, the opportunity cost doctrine evaluates an option by comparing its
value to the value of best alternative. If plan B is the best alternative  to plan A (and the plans are
mutually exclusive), then the opportunity cost of choosing plan A is the value foregone by not choosing
plan B.  Plan A is preferable if its value exceeds its opportunity cost (assuming both can be
quantitatively measured). The application of the opportunity  cost doctrine requires the analysis and
evaluation of the best alternative-and  that is the more general role of devil's advocacy even when
quantitative values are not available. By eliciting plan B, devil's advocacy generalizes the opportunity
cost doctrine from cost-benefit analysis to general policy analysis. In a rivalrous market or in a multi-
party democracy, competition provides the B plans so organizational  devil's advocacy could be seen as
an attempt to provide benchmark competition within an organization.
The general case for a more systematic devil's advocate  or countervailance  role in an organization is
much the same as the case for genuine debate and open discussion. The locus classicus for that
argument is John Stuart Mill's 1859 essay On Liberty. If little is known on a question, then real debate
and the "clash of adverse opinions" are some of the best engines of discovery. If "partial truths" are
known, then the same is necessary to ferret out a clearer picture and to better adapt theories to new and
different contexts. Mill argued that even in cases of settled opinions, debate and discussion serve to
disturb the "deep slumber of a decided opinion" so that it might be held more as a rational conviction
rather than as an article of faith.
So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that
if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and
supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skillful devil's advocate can
conjure up. [Mill 1972, 105]
Non-dogmatism and Socratic Ignorance in Organizations
I have argued that organizational learning can best take place if open competition, devil's advocacy,
and the collision of ideas is allowed instead of being suppressed in favor of an outward show of
allegiance to Official Views. This openness is now taken for granted in the institutions of higher
learning as well as in the informal communities of the scientific disciplines but many development
agencies still operate on the basis of the church/Party model regardless of the espoused theory.
I now turn from that class of competition- or rivalry-based arguments to a different type of argument
against having Official Views in an organization aspiring to be a learning organization and aspiring to
fostering learning in its clients.  We are accustomed  to themes developed both volitionally (changing
the world to agree with a desired representation) and cognitively (changing a representation to agree
with the world). One theme was that the helper should not impose actions on the doers. In the
cognitive version of that theme, the helper needs to refrain from trying to teach or impose a certain
29representation or view on the doers. 44 That will call for the helper to display a non-assertiveness, non-
dogmatism, cognitive humility, 45 tolerance, "egolessness," 46 or Socratic ignorance. 47 This Socratic
humility or ignorance is the cognitive counterpart  to the forbearance  of material assistance in a way that
would undercut the volition of self-help on the part of the doers.
Towards an Open Learning Agency and Autonomy-Compatible  Assistance
The idea that a development agency  has to always have an Official View (rather than house competing
views) is about as scientific as the "scientific"  socialism of the Communist Parties of the past. John
Dewey quotes the English Communist John Strachey's  statement that the communistic parties' "refusal
to tolerate the existence of incompatible  opinions ... [is] simply asserting  the claim that Socialism is
scientific." Dewey goes on to comment that it "would  be difficult, probably impossible, to find a more
direct and elegantly finished denial of all the qualities that make ideas and theories either scientific or
democratic than is contained in this statement." [1939, 96] Critical reason and scientific  iethodology
go in quite the opposite direction of fostering the
willingness to  hold  belief in  suspense, ability to  doubt  until evidence is  obtained;
willingness to go where evidence points instead of putting first a personally preferred
conclusion; [and] ability to hold ideas in solution and use them as hypotheses to be
tested instead of as dogmas to be asserted;...[Dewey 1939, 145]
This part of the scientific attitude is translated into the policy domain with such suggestions as multiple
advocacy [Haas 1990, 210] and double visioning [see Schon 1983, 281]. It is not some w&  anton
perversity that prevents this scientific attitude from being implemented in a large organization such as a
major development agency. There are quite human impulses that push for conformity and rigidity.
To hold theories and principles in solution, awaiting confirmation, goes contrary to the
grain.  Even today questioning a statement made by a person is often taken by him as a
reflection upon his integrity, and is resented.  For many millennia opposition to views
widely held in a community was intolerable. It called down the wrath of the deities who
are in charge of the group.... Baconian idols of the tribe, the cave, the theater, and den
have caused men to rush to conclusions, and then to use all their powers to defend from
criticism and change the conclusions arrived at. [Dewey 1939, 146]
44 The Socratic-Kantian  Leonard Nelson emphasizes  this aspect of the Socratic process of instruction. "Philosophical
instruction fulfills its task when it systematically  weakens the influences that obstruct the growth of philosophical
comprehension and reinforces those that promote it. Without going into the question of other relevant influences, let us
keep firmly in mind the one that must be excluded unconditionally: the influence that may emanate from the instructor's
assertions. If this influence is not eliminated,  all labor is vain. The instructor will have done everything  possible to forestall
the pupil's own judgment by offering him a ready-made  judgment." [Nelson 1949, 19]
45 "But all true effort to help begins with self-humiliation:  the helper must first humble himself under him he would help,
and therewith must understand that to help does not mean to be a sovereign but to be a servant, that to help does not mean to
be ambitious but to be patient, that to help means to endure for the time being the imputation  that one is in the wrong and
does not understand what the other understands." [Kierkegaard in: Bretall 1946, 334]
46  Davenport and Prusak 1998, 113.
47 "True Socraticism represents first and foremost an attitude of mind, an intellectual humility easily mistaken for arrogance,
since  the true Socratic is convinced of the ignorance not only of himself but of all mankind. This rather than any body of
positive doctrine is the contribution  of Socrates." [Guthrie 1960, 75]
30If development agencies are to promote knowledge-based  development as education writ large, then
they might learn organizational  lessons from educational institutions such as universities about the
need to foster open debate and competing  theories within the organization. The scientific method
demands no less.
If the development agency can move beyond the church (or science-as-dogma)  model to an open
learning model, then it can also move from the standard  knowledge  transmission-belt methodology
towards autonomy-compatible  knowledge-based  development  assistance.
The aim of teaching is not only to transmit information, but also to transform students
from passive recipients of other people's knowledge into active constructors of their
own and other's knowledge.  The teacher cannot transform without the student's active
participation, of course.  Teaching is fundamentally about creating the pedagogical,
social, and ethical conditions under which students agree to take charge of their own
learning, individually and collectively. [Elmore 1991, xvi]
That activist pedagogy adapted to developing countries as the learners would constitute autonomy-
compatible knowledge-based  development assistance.
Revisiting  Hirschmanian  Themes of Social Learning and Change
Reframing the Debate about Conditionalities
In these last sections, the task is to map helping theory back into the Hirschmanian approach to
development. Conditionalities on development loans or donor grants are much like the plan
specifications in a model of centrally planned and socially engineered  reforms. In the literature on aid
for economic development, a substantial body of research now questions the effectiveness of
conditionalities in policy-based lending such as structural adjustment loans (SALs). 48 The doubts apply
less to the "pro forma," "stroke-of-the-pen,"  or price-based conditionalities  than to those aimed at
institutional reforms. In the face of these doubts, what is to be done?
Some practitioners plod onward thinking that they only need to make conditionalities "tougher"  and
more "performance-based." Such practices do little to address some of the basic reasons for the
ineffectiveness. Tougher performance-based  conditionalities do not solve the basic motivational
problem. This may seem strange from the narrow economic viewpoint, e.g., agency theory. Doesn't
the carrot of aid provide the motivation? In psychological  terms, the problem is that the aid only
provides extrinsic motivation. Real reforms beyond the stroke-of-the-pen  variety will usually require
some own-reasons or more intrinsic motivations for successful implementation. Otherwise there is
only the motivation to make the minimal outward changes to get the aid. In addition, there is a
negative reactance against the attempt to externally impose changes. Making conditionalities "tougher
and more performance-based" does not even attempt to solve these underlying motivational problems.
Another approach to the doubts about aid-baited conditionalities is to emphasize that aid works best in
countries that have good policies and that aid is largely wasted in countries with poor policies. In light
of the doubts about conditionalities turning around poor policies, it is suggested that aid should be
focused where it is most effective independent of conditionalities, i.e., on the countries with good
48  See the discussion and references in Mosley et al. 1991, World Bank 1998,  and Killick et al. 1998.
31policy environments. This might be interpreted as suggesting a good-policy screen as one large ex ante
or 'front-loaded' conditionality so that other conditionalities  are not needed thereafter. But this would
more finesse the problem than solve it.  The problem is the social learning process to get a country
from poor policies to better policies. This one-big-carrot  approach has the same if not worse
motivational problems as the many-small-carrots  approach. Moreover it is doubtful that it would be
sustained under real world conditions of partial fulfillment. If the list of good policies was partly but
not completely fulfilled, then strong political and disbursement  pressures would build (from both sides)
to give at least "half a carrot" and we are in effect back to the many-small-carrots  approach.
Aid agencies have their preconceptions  of "virtue" in the sense of good policies. They tr) to "buy
virtue" by imposing conditionalities  on program aid geared to "virtuous behavior" defined by various
outward acts of allegiance to and implementation of "good policies." But if we take "virtue" as being
defined not just by behavior but also by the right internal motives, then aid can only buy a faux virtue.
Such aid pushes the extemal motive of receiving the aid into the motivational  foreground and thus
establishes external control-the lack of autonomy.
Autonomy-compatible  aid would remove impediments and thus enable "virtuous action" where the
internal motive was already present in accordance with the idea of finding out what people are already
motivated to do and helping them do it better. 49 "In these situations, the donor would set himself the
task of rewarding virtue (or rather, what he considers as such) where virtue appears of its own
accord." 50 This leads straightaway  to the "paradox"  that aid is only autonomy-compatible  when it does
not do what is conventionally  taken as a major purpose of program aid-to  tip the balance of motives
in favor of reforms and good policies.
Paradoxically, therefore, program aid is fully effective only when it does not  achieve
anything-when,  that is, no quid pro quo (in the sense of a policy that would not have
been undertaken in the absence of aid) is exacted as the price of aid. [Hirschman 1971,
204]
Moreover, once it is known that "virtue" is being rewarded  by the donor, then mimicry in the form of
"virtuous behavior" may be elicited in order to also be rewarded. This supply effect of such externally
motivated mimicry greatly complicates the provision of aid.
External interventions by other people intended to change a person's behavior pose a threat to
autonomy. The threat-to-autonomy  or reactance effect results from using external motiv,ators-carrots
and sticks-to  shift the locus of causality from internal to external. The effect shows itself in a poor
quality and low effort performance, in sullen and perfunctory  behavior fulfilling the letter but not the
spirit of an agreement, and perhaps even in the urge to defiantly  do the opposite  just to show one's
autonomy. 5'  Hirschman refers to these effects as the "hidden  costs" [1971, 207] of program aid while
Lepper and Greene [1978] called them the "hidden  costs of rewards."
49  " The first task is to study what people are already doing..  .and to help them do it better....
The second task is to study what people need and to investigate the possibility of helping them to cover more of their needs
out of their own productive efforts." [Schumacher 1997, 125]
50 Hirschman 1971,  204. Italics added.
5'  "Whatever task is not chosen of man's own free will, whatever constrains  or even only guides him, does not become part
of his nature.  It remains forever alien to him; if he performs it, he does so not with true humane energy but with mere
mechanical skill." [von Humboldt 1963,  47]
32In the aid context, "good policies" bought by conditioned  aid are usually not effective. If the policies
adopted by the government were distorted by aid conditionality,  then the policies would tend to be
adopted by aid-hungry governments in spite of continuing doubts of the policy makers
themselves, resistance from some quarters within the government, onslaught against the
"deal" from the opposition, and general distaste for the whole procedure.
Naturally, doubts and reservations are not voiced at the moment of the aid
compact; hence the delusion on the part of the donor that there has been a full meeting
of minds.  But soon after virtue has been "bought" through aid under these conditions,
the reservations and resistances will find some expression-for  example, through half-
hearted implementation or sabotage of the agreed-to policies-and  relations between
donor and recipient will promptly deteriorate as a result. [Hirschman 1971, 205]
The debate about conditionalities is to some extent ill-posed. In 'psychological'  terms, the question is
how to best indirectly foster the country's own motivation for reforms as opposed to the agency theory
question of how to best impose carrots and sticks (extrinsic motivation) to promote reforms. Where
are the possible reforms that have some rootedness or embeddedness  in the country and are not in
response to an offer of assistance? The best way to assure that a reform project has some "intrinsic
motivation" or rootedness is not to start a project but to find it. 52
I began to look for elements and processes..  .that did work, perhaps in roundabout and
unappreciated fashion.  [T]his search for possible hidden rationalities was to give an
underlying unity to my work. ... [T]he hidden rationalities  I was after were precisely and
principally  processes of growth and change already under way in the societies I studied,
processes that were often unnoticed by the actors immediately involved, as well as by
foreign experts and advisors. [Hirschman 1984, 91-3]
With this reframing, the conditionality  debate joins an older debate between balanced and 'unbalanced'
notions of growth.
Hirschman's Theory of Unbalanced Growth
From the earliest postwar discussions of growth, it seemed clear that developing countries were caught
in many vicious circles of poverty and that coordinated  actions along a broad front-a big push-might
be necessary to exploit the many mutually supporting complementarities  and to thus escape the low-
level trap.  Formal growth models emphasized  the efficiency  properties of balanced growth paths and
development planning models also reinforced the mental image of coordinated action across sectors.
All of these fell into the general category of balanced growth models.
All the balanced growth models suffered from the same problem of in effect assuming that which
needed to be developed. A country with the wherewithal to carry out a coordinated 'big push' of
across-the-board  developmental actions would already be well on its way to development (particularly
in terms of capability), not languishing in a low-level poverty trap. These models also made the more
subtle but equally if not more dubious assumption  that all the relevant agents in a country would
52  Note  the contrast  with  the project  manager  in  the agency  who  wants  to show  his boss  that  he "made  a difference"  by
starting  a project  in the country.
33simultaneously undergo the required social learning and transformations of habits that would be
required for the big push to succeed (as if a school of fish would altogether decide to jump out of the
water and become a new species of amphibians). That is not how social learning tends to take place.
Albert 0. Hirschman 53 was one of the few voices dissenting from the then near-litany of balanced
growth, big push, and national planning models: "if a country were ready to apply the doctrine of
balanced growth, then it would not be underdeveloped  in the first place." [1961 (1958), 53-4] In terms
of the conditionalities debate, if a country could actually fulfill the typical "Christmas  tree" of
conditionalities attached to multilateral lending, then it would not be in a low-level developmental trap
in the first place.
In contrast to the balanced growth approach, Hirschman developed a theory of unbalanced growth
which might usefully be viewed as a theory of social learning and social change. 54 In the 1961 preface
to the paperback edition of The Strategy of Economic Development, Hirschman  restates the essential
point of the theory.
True, automotive vehicles are not much good without highways and modern highways
are rather useless without vehicles. But this does not mean that the only or even the best
way in which we can develop our transportation system is by expanding simultaneously
and  evenly both  the automotive industry and the highway network.  Why not take
advantage of the stimulus that is set up by expansion of the one toward that of the other?
In other words, I do not deny by any means the interrelatedness of various economic
activities of which the balanced growth theory has made so much.  On the contrary, I
propose that we take advantage of it, that we probe into the structure that is holding
together these interrelated activities. As in the atom, there is much energy here that can
be and is in fact being utilized in building up economic development nuclei.  Later on
these nuclei look as though they could never have been separated even for a single
instant when in actual fact they might never have been assembled had not a sequential
solution, i.e., an unbalanced growth sequence been found, by  accident, instinct,  or
reasoned design.  To look at unbalanced growth means, in other words, to look at the
dynamics of the development process in the small.  But perhaps it is high time that we
did just that. [Hirschman 1961, viii-ix]
The emphasis on the "dynamics of the development  process in the small" has not been well received by
university economists devising formal macroeconomic  models of growth 55-nor by those who try to
apply these models in the work of multilateral development institutions.
Learning and change is driven by problem-solving. Not all problems can be attacked at once so
attention and aid is first focused in the small on the sectors or localities where some of the
preconditions are in place and where initiative is afoot on its own.  The initial small successes will then
5  The locus classicus  is his 1958 The Strategy  of Economic  Development  but see also Streeten 1959 as well  as a few of
Hirschman's  self-subverting  caveats in chapter 3 of  A Propensity  to Self-Subversion  [1995].
54 See for instance Schon 1994.
5In  effect, Hirschman said that both the theorist and the practical policymaker could and should ignore the pressures to
produce buttoned-down, mathematically  consistent analyses and adopt instead a sort of muscular  pragmatism in grappling
with the problem of development. Along with some others, notably Gunnar Myrdal, Hirschman did not wait for intellectual
exile: he proudly gathered up his followers and led them into the wilderness himself. Unfortunately,  they perished there."
[Krugman 1994, 40]
34create pressures through the forward and backward linkages to foster learning and change that is nearby
in sectorial or locational terms-all of which might lead to a growth pole or local industrial district. The
successes when broadcast horizontally to those facing similar problems will start to break down the
paralyzing beliefs that "nothing  can be done" and will thus fuel broader initiatives that take the early
wins as their benchmark. Unlike a model that assumes large-scale  organized social action directed  by
the government under the pressure of external conditionalities,  the parties are responding to local
pressures and inducements from their economic partners or to opportunities revealed by others in a
similar position.
One thing leads to, induces, elicits, or entrains another thing through chains of "tensions,
disproportions, and disequilibria." Hirschman at one point refers to the principle of unbalanced growth
as "the idea of maximizing induced decisionmaking" [1994a, 278]. The problem-solving pressures
induced by unbalanced growth will call forth otherwise unused resources and enlist otherwise untapped
energies. As a project moves from one bottleneck and crisis to another (in comparison with the smooth
planned allocation of resources in a project), then "resources  and abilities that are hidden, scattered, or
badly utilized" [1961, 5] will be mobilized. Hirschman [1984, 95] notes the connections with Cyert
and March's notion of "organizational  slack" [1963] based on Herbert Simon's theory of "satisficing"
[1955], with Nathan Rosenberg's theory [1969] that technological  innovation is strongly influenced  by
"inducing" or "focusing" events such as strikes and wars, and, above all, with Harvey Leibenstein's
theory of X-inefficiency [1966, 1980]. Israel [1987] addresses these issues under the notion of
"competition surrogates."
One can draw analogies to the process of individual learning. Suppose one takes a static snap-shot of a
person's beliefs before and after learning some new and complex interconnected subject matter. The
older set of beliefs might have certain self-reinforcing  properties. It might at first seem difficult to
change one part of the set of beliefs since one would then have some cognitive dissonance with the
remaining older beliefs. One could imagine simply changing all the beliefs at once to arrive at a new
self-reinforcing set. But that is rarely how learning takes place. Against the forces of self-preservation
of the "whole cloth" of older beliefs, there are the incentives  to solve problems for which the old
beliefs might be inadequate. Change might start in the small where problem-solving progress might be
made by unraveling and changing some of the beliefs. But now the interconnections can help to
unravel the older cloth. "Bottlenecks"  or inconsistencies  will appear between the old and new beliefs,
and problem-solving pressures will be transmitted forwards, backwards, and sideways to adjust other
beliefs.  "One  thing leads to another" and eventually  the person will arrive at a new set of
interconnected  beliefs.
Now consider the viewpoint of the knowledgeable outsider, a "teacher,"  who understood all along the
problem-solving superiority of the new set of beliefs. Why couldn't she just give a "core course" to
impart the new knowledge to the student and thereby save the pupil all the time, energy, and pain of
"learning the hard way"? Carrots and sticks, aid and conditionalities,  could even incentivize the
"learning process." While a veneer of some "knowledgeable  behaviors" might be incentivized-
particularly in "good students"-by such carrots and sticks, learning that transforms older beliefs does
not take place in that manner. In order for learners to have an "ownership"  of new knowledge and for
the new knowledge to have a transformative effect, the knowledge  must be more the fruits of the
learner's own activities. Such knowledge comes out of a constructivist active learning process, not out
of a pedagogy of the teacher imparting, transmitting, disseminating,  or pouring new knowledge into
35passive students. With a constructivist  pedagogy,  the teacher is more a coach, guide, and midwife
helping the learners in a more indirect manner to help themselves.
Hirschman uses the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle for the set of problems facing a developing country
[1961, 81-2]. One could imagine a rather superhuman  act of putting all the pieces together at once to
solve the puzzle.  Indeed don't those who have seen and studied seemingly similar puzzles put together
elsewhere have that knowledge? That is the comforting fantasy of those who promote integrated and
balanced reform programs. Do all these things together (so that it looks like the "picture on the puzzle
box") and you will have solved your problems! But for the variety of reasons outlined above, countries
cannot just solve all their problems at once. They must start with a few pieces that fit together and try
to work outward to find other pieces that fit. Not all starting points are equal. Certain pieces of the
puzzle may have nearby connections that allow building that part of the puzzle quickly-as opposed to
parts whose solution might give little insight or impetus to solving the nearby parts.  Perhaps someone
who has seen similar puzzles solved would be a good coach to suggest promising starting points or
fruitful directions for progress. No doubt it would be helpful to study the "picture on the box." But the
actual solving of the puzzle is a piecemeal process starting in one or more propitious places and
working outward through fruitful linkages to finally arrive at the new overall configuration.
The Hirschmanian unbalanced growth approach  to institutional change is an alternative to the planning
approaches that try to "do everything at once" for fear that piecemeal attempts will fail (as they
undoubtedly might).  That is why it is important to choose the "pieces" of the piecemeal or incremental
approach quite carefully.
A comprehensive attack on all the problems faced by an institution cannot hope to
achieve "final" results in a specified time.  Instead, a few aspects can be identified on
which progress is feasible given the general operational level of the institution, and the
program can concentrate on those aspects for a  reasonable period, say, three years.
After that, the progress that has been made will have ripple effects on other parts of the
institution.  At that point a new program can be designed that takes account of the new
realities-including changes in personnel-but that focuses on another limited nimber of
objectives.  In sum, comprehensiveness in scope and in time should be abandoned in
institutional development efforts, and a partial, cumulative, and highly focused approach
pursued. [Israel 1987, 200]
As social learning processes develop largely on the basis of their own released energies, new demands
will be made on the center or government to reform institutions, to provide infrastructure,  and to clear
away impediments, 56 and that in turn will spur further progress on the ground.
There are many well-known public or  semipublic goods of this  sort, from  power,
transportation, and  irrigation to  education and public  health.  Often designated  as
56 Hirschman  quotes approvingly a consulting engineer who suggests a road surface that would better elicit pressure for
maintenance  on the public works authorities. "We assumed that, with the increasing truck and bus industry in Columbia,
local pressure would be applied to the Ministry of Public Works to repair the deep holes which will develop in cheap
bituminous  pavements if maintenance and retreatment is delayed,  and that such pressure would be greater than if a gravel
and stone road is allow to deteriorate." [1958, 143] This strategy might be compared in effectiveness to a "conditionality"
toward the same end.
36"infrastructure," as though they were preconditions for the more directly productive
activities, these goods have more usually been provided in response to urgent demands
emanating  from  such  activities  and  from  their  need  for  consolidation,  greater
profitability, and further expansion. [Hirschman 1981, 80-1]
These induced demands for reforms are quite different from the externally imposed conditionalities
that stipulate certain reforms or from reforms given by the benevolent "grace" of the rulers."  In
psychological terms, the domestic induced demands for reforms supplies the government with a more
"intrinsic" motivation for reform in contrast to the "tough performance-based"  carrots and sticks
imposed by external development  agencies and donors, and in contrast to gifts from benevolent
benefactors. In making the reforms, the government is "in the driver's seat" and is doing its job of
responding to its constituents, not just caving in to foreign pressures. It is not just playing another
round in the aid game: "we will continue pretending to make the reforms so that you can continue
pretending to be buying reforns with your aid."
Conclusion:  The Two Paths
In conclusion, we return to the two paths that diverge from a recognition of the basic conundrum of
helping people help themselves; how can external help support an internally-driven  process without
overriding or undercutting  it?  On the direct or social engineering  path, the "helper"  helps the doers by
supplying distorted motivation (conditional aid) and "managed"  knowledge (ex cathedra answers
buttressed by biased information and one-sided arguments)  to deliver (what the helper takes as) the
right results.  On the other indirect and autonomy-respecting  path, the helper helps the doers to help
themselves by supplying not "motivation"  but perhaps resources to enable the doers to do what they
were already own-motived to do. On the knowledge side, the autonomy-respecting  helper supplies not
answers but helps build learning capacity (e.g., by enabling access to unbiased information and to
hearing all sides of an argument) to enable the doers to learn from whatever source in a self-directed
learning process.
Autonomy-compatible  assistance cannot be reduced to a checklist or engineering  plan to be enforced
by well-designed carrots and sticks. Direct methods can help others, but they cannot help others to
help themselves. That requires autonomy-compatible  indirect methods on the part of the helpers and
autonomous self-activity on the part of the doers. People need not only to "participate"  but to be in the
driver's seat in order to make their actions their own and to make their learnings their own. It is the
psychological version of the old principle that people have a natural ownership of the fruits of their
labor. The helpers can use indirect and autonomy-compatible  enabling approaches to bring the doers to
the threshold; the doers have to do the rest on their own and that is what makes it their own
development.
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42Appendix:  Eight Authors  in Search of Helping Theory
Helper cannot  "Help" as
Themes  Starting from where  See through the  impose  change on  benevolence is  Doers in the driver's
Author  the doers are.  doers' eyes.  doers.  ineffective.  seat.
Helper-Doer  ("Neither an  ("nor  a gift.")
Helper-Doer  imposition...
Albert  Hirschman  "I  began to look for elements  "But word soon came from  "I reacted against the visiting-  "[T]hey will be supplied  with  "In recent years, the concept  of
and processes... that did work,  World Bank headquarters  that  economist syndrome; that is,  a great many ideas,  dependencia-perhaps best
Development  perhaps in roundabout  and  I was principally expected to  against the habit of issuing  suggestions,  plans, and  translated  as lack of autonomy-
Advisor-Govt.  unappreciated  fashion.  [T]his  take, as soon as possible,  the  peremptory advice and  ideologies,  frequently of  has been intensively  studied in
Latin America. . ..With  the
search for possible hidden  initiative in formulating some  prescription  by calling on  foreign origin or based  on  brightest members  of [Brazil's]
rationalities  was to give an  ambitious economic  universally valid economic  foreign  experience. ...  Genuine  younger generation  almost all
underlying unity to my work.  development plan that would  principles and remedies-be  learning  about the problem  going  abroad for graduate
... [Tihe  hidden rationalities  I  spell out investments,  they old or brand new-after  will sometimes  be prevented  studies, they assume upon
was after were precisely and  domestic  savings, growth, and  a strictly minimal  not only by the local policy-  retuming (if they  retum at all)
principally processes  of  foreign aid targets for the  acquaintance with the  makers' eagemess to jump to  that,  having sat at the feet of true
growth  and change  already  Colombian economy  over the  'patient.'...  I tried to identify  a ready-made solution  but  knowledge  in the university  of
under way in the societies I  next few years.  All of this  progressive economic  and  also by the insistent  offer of  some  advanced country, they no
studied, processes that were  was alleged to be quite simple  political forces that deserved  help and advice on the part of  longer need to bother with what
their elder compatriots  have to
often unnoticed  by the actors  for experts mastering the new  recognition and help.  This  powerful outsiders....  [Sluch  offer as a result of experience  and
immediately involved,  as well  programming technique:  position put me at odds with  practices [will] tend to cut  mature reflection.  . was struck
as by foreign experts and  apparently there now existed  those who judged  that the  short that 'long confrontation  and disturbed  by the prevalence,
advisors." [1984, 91-3]  adequate knowledge, even  present society was 'rotten  between man and a situation'  in Latin America,  of a style  of
without close study of local  through and through'  and that  (Camus) so fruitful for the  policy-making  and problem-
surroundings, of the likely  nothing would ever change  achievement of genuine  solving that ostensibly  denied the
ranges of...  all the key figures  unless everything was  progress  in problem-solving."  existence  or even possibility  of a
needed.  ...  changed at once.  But this  [1973, 239-40]  cumulative learning  process  .It
My instinct was to try to  utopian dream of the 'visiting  is possibn  e that this style . arises
understand  better their  revolutionary' seemed to me  internal communication
patterns of action, rather than  of a piece with the balanced  characteristic  of countries  that,...,
assume from the outset that  growth and integrated  continue to rely in policy-making
they could only be 'developed'  development schemes  of the  on economic and social  ideas
by importing a set of  visiting economist."  [1984,  imported  from abroad. It is not
techniques  they knew nothing  93_4]  an accident  that the style is often
about."  [1984, 90-1]  abetted  by the foreign expelt who
is one of its principal
beneficiaries."  [1973,  v-vi]
43Helper  cannot  "Help"  as
Themes  Starting  from where  See through  the  impose change  on  benevolence  is  Doers in the driver's
the doers are.  doers'  eyes.  doers.  ineffective.  seat.
Author  ("Neither  an  ("nor  a gift.")
Helper-Doer  imposition,...)
"Is it the pupil's own problem,  "When the parent or teacher  "We are even likely to take  "To 'make others happy'  "The  essentials  of the method  are
or is it the teacher's or  has provided the conditions  the influence of superior  force  except through  liberating their  therefore  identical with the
John  Dewey  textbook's problem, made  a  which stimulate thinking and  for control,  forgetting that  powers  and engaging  them in  essentials  of reflection. They are
Teacher-Learner  problem for the pupil only  has taken  a sympathetic  while we may lead a horse to  activities that enlarge the  first  that the pupil have a genuine
because he cannot get the  attitude toward the activities  water we cannot make him  meaning of life is to harm  situation of experience-that
requiredmarkorbepromoted  of  the leareer  by entering  into  drink;  and that while we can  them and to indulge  ourselves  which he is interested  for its own required mark or be promioted  oftelanrbtneigit  rn;adtatwiew  a  hmadt  nug  usle  hich he is  cninteresated iorits  own
or win the teacher's approval,  a common or conjoint  shut a man up in a  under  cover of exercising a  sake; secondly,  that a genuine
unless he deals with it? ...  Is  experience, all has been done  penitentiary  we cannot  make  special virtue ....  To foster  problem  develop within this
the experience a personal  which a second party can do  him penitent.  ...  When we  conditions  that widen the  situation as a stimulus  to thought;
thing of such a nature as  to instigate leaming....  In such  confuse a physical with an  horizon of others and give  third, that he possess  the informa-
inherently to stimulate  and  shared activity, the teacher  is  educative result, we always  them command of their own  tion and make the observations
direct observation of the con-  a learner, and the leamer is,  lose the chance  of enlisting  powers,  so that they can find  needed  to deal with it; fourth, that
nections involved, and to lead  without knowing it, a  the person's own participating  their own happiness  in their  suggested  solutions  occur to him
which he shall be responsible  for
to inference and its testing?  teacher-and  upon the whole,  disposition  in getting the  own fashion, is the way of  developing  in an orderly  way;
Or is it imposed from without,  the less consciousness  there  result desired,  and thereby of  "social" action.  Otherwise the  fifth,  that he have opportunity
and is the pupil's problem  is, on either side, of either  developing within him an  prayer of a freeman  would be  and occasion  to test his ideas by
simply to meet the external  giving or receiving  intrinsic and persisting  to be left alone,  and to be  application, to make their
requirement?" [1916,  155]  instruction,  the better." [1916,  direction in the right way."  delivered,  above all, from  meaning clear and to discover for
160]  [1916, 26-71  "reformers" and "kind"  himself their  validity."  [t916,
people."  [1957, 270]  163]
Douglas  "It is one of the favorite pas-  "Perhaps the most critical  "[The manager's] task is to  "Management has adopted  "The important theoretical
times of headquarters groups  point-and  the one hardest  to  help [workers]  discover  generally a far more humani-  consideration,  derived  from
McGregor  to decide from within their  keep clearly in mind-is  that  objectives consistent  both  tarian set of values; it has  Theory  Y, is that the accep-
Manager-Workers  professional  ivory tower what  help is always defined by the  with organizational  successfully  striven to give  tance of responsibility  (for
help the field organization  recipient.  Taking an action  requirements and with their  more equitable  and more  self-direction  and self-
needs and to design and  with respect to  someone  own personal goals, and to do  generous  treatment to its  control)  is correlated  with
develop  programs for meeting  because 'it is best for him,' or  so in ways which will  employees.  It has signifi-  commitment to objectives.
these 'needs.' ...  because  'it is for the good of  encourage  genuine  cantly reduced  economic  Genuine  commitment  is
If the staff is genuinely con-  the organization,'  may be  commitment to these  hardships, eliminated  the  seldom achieved when  ob-
cerned with providing profes-  influencing him, but it is not  objectives.  Beyond this, his  more extreme forms of  jectives  are externally  im-
sional help to all levels of  providing  help unless he so  task is to help them achieve  industrial  warfare, provided a  posed.  Passive  acceptance  is
management it will devote a  perceives  it." [1960,  163]  those objectives: to act as  generally safe and pleasant  the most that can be expected;
great deal  of tiniie to exploring  teacher, consultaint, colleague,  working environment,  but ;r  indifference  or resistance are
'client' needs directly, and to  and only rarely as  has done all these things  the more likely consequences.
helping the client find  authoritative  boss. Ile will not  without changing  its  Some degree  of mutual
solutions which satisfy him.  help them if he attempts to  fundamental  theory of  involvement  in the
Often the most effective  keep direction and control in  management.  ... [The]  determination  of objectives  is
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strategy for this purpose  is  his own hands; he will only  assumptions  of Theory X  a necessary  aspect of
one in which the client devel-  hamper their growth and  remain predominant  through-  managerial  planning  based on
ops his own solution with  encourage them to develop  out our economy."  [1960, 45-  Theory Y." [1960, 681
professional  help." [1960,  countermeasures  against  6]
168-91  him." [1960,  1521
Carl Rogers  "1  have not found psycho-  "This formulation  would state  "The scientist  with the  "[A]ttempts  to produce these  "Individuals  have within
therapy or group experience  that  it is the counselor's  divided sea urchin egg  ...  changesfor  the community by  themselves  vast resources  for
Therapist-Patient  effective when I have tried to  function to assume, in so far  could not cause the cell to  means of ready made  self-understanding  and for
create in another individual  as he is able, the internal  develop  in one way or an-  institutions  and programs  altering their self-concepts,
something  that is not already  frame of reference of the  other, but when  he focused  planned,  developed,  financed,  basic attitudes,  and self-
there; I have found, however,  client, to perceive the world  his skill on providing  the  and managed by persons  directed behavior;  these
that if I can provide the  as the client sees it, to  conditions  that permitted the  outside  the community are not  resources  can be tapped  if a
conditions  that allow growth  perceive the client himself as  cell to survive and grow, the  likely to meet with  any more  definable climate of
to occur, then this positive  he is seen  by himself, to lay  tendency for growth and the  success  in the future than they  facilitative psychological
directional  tendency brings  aside all perceptions  from the  direction of growth were  have in the past.  This  attitudes  can be provided.
constructive  results."  [1980,  external frame of reference  evident, and came from  procedure  is psychologically  These conditions  apply
120]  while doing  so, and to  within the organism.  I cannot  unsound  because it places the  whether we are speaking of
communicate  something of  think of a better  analogy for  residents of the community in  the relationship  between
this empathic  understanding  therapy or the group  an inferior position  and  therapist and client, parent
to the client." [Rogers  1951,  experience, where, if I can  implies serious reservations  and child,  leader and group,
29]  supply  a psychological  am-  with regard to their capacities  teacher and student,  or
niotic fluid,  forward move-  and interest in their own  administrator  and staff."
ment of a constructive  sort  welfare."[Clifford  Shaw  [1980,  1151
will occur." [1980,  120-1]  quoted  in Rogers  1951, 59]
" We cannot teach another
person  directly;  we can only
facilitate  his learning....  'You
can  lead a horse to water but
you can't make him drink."'
[1951, 3891
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S0ren  That if reat success is to  "For to be a teacher  does not  "First and foremost, no  "If I [teacher] am disposed  to  "For my own Error is
attend the effort to bring a  mean simply to affirm that  impatience.  If he [teacher]  plume myself on my greater  something  I can discover  only
Kierkegaard  man to a definite position,  such a thing is so, or to  becomes  impatient, he will  understanding,  it is because  I  by myself, since it is only
Spiritual Teacher-  one must first of all take pains  deliver a lecture, &c.  No, to  rush headlong against  [the  am vain or proud,  so that at  when I discover it that it is
Learmer  to find HIM where he is and  be a teacher  in the right sense  other person's illusion] and  bottom, instead of benefiting  discovered, even if the whole
begin there.  is to be a learner.  Instruction  accomplish nothing.  A direct  him, I want to be admired.  world knew of it before."
That is the secret of the art of  begins when  you, the teacher,  attack only strengthens a  But all true effort to help  [1946,  1581
helping others.  Anyone  who  learn from the learner, put  person in his illusion, and at  begins with self-humiliation:  "The observer does not attain
has not mastered this is  yourself  in his place so that  the same time embitters him.  the helper  must first humble  a result immediately,  but must
himself deluded when he  you may understand  what he  There is nothing that requires  himself under  him he would  himself take pains to  find it,
proposes to help others."  understands  and in the way he  such gentle handling  as an  help, and therewith  must  and thereby the direct
[Bretall 1946, 333]  understands  it, in case you  illusion, if one wishes to  understand  that to help does  relationship is broken.  But
have not understood it  dispel it.  If anything prompts  not mean to be a sovereign  this breach  is precisely the act
before." [1946, 3351  the prospective captive to set  but to be a servant, that to  of self-activity, the irruption
his will in opposition,  all is  help does not mean to be  of inwardness, the first
lost." [1946, 3321  ambitious but to be patient,  determination of the truth as
that to help means to endure  inwardness."  [1946, 223]
for the time being the
imputation that  one is in the
wrong and does not
understand  what the other
understands,"  [1946, 334]
Saul Alinsky  "As an organizer I start from  "An organizer  can  "If you respect the dignity of  "Self-respect arises  only out  "After all, the real democratic
where the world is, as it is,  communicate only  within the  the individual you are  of people who play an active  program  is a democratically
Organiizer-  not as I would like it to be.  areas of experience of his  working with, then his  role in solving their  own  minded people-a  healthy,
Community  That we accept the world as it  audience; otherwise  there is  desires, not yours; his values,  crises and who are not  active, participating,
is does not in any sense  no communication  not yours; his ways of  helpless, passive, puppet-like  interested, self-confident
weaken our desire to change  Through his imagination  he is  working and fighting,  not  recipients of private or public  people  who, through  their
it into what we believe  it  constantly moving in on the  yours; his choice of  services.  To give people  participation  and interest,
should  be-it  is necessary to  happenings of others,  leadership, not yours;  his  help, while denying them a  become informed,  educated,
begin where the world is if we  identifying with them and  programs,  not yours, are  significant part in the action,  and above all develop  faith in
are going to change it to what  extracting their happenings  important and must be  contributes nothing to the  themselves, their fellow men,
we think it should be.  That  into his own mental digestive  followed; except if  his  development  of the  and the future.  The people
means working in the  system and thereby  programs  violate the high  individual.  In the deepest  themselves are the future.
system." 11971, xix]  accumulating more  values of a free and open  sense  it is not giving but  The people themselves  will
experience.  It is essential for  society."  [1971, 122]  taking-taking  their dignity.  solve each problem that will
communication  that he know  Denial  of the opportunity  for  arise out of a changing  world.
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of their experiences."  [1971,  participation  is the denial of  They will if they, the people,
69-701  human dignity and demo-  have the opportunity  and
cracy. It will not work."  power to make and enforce
[1971, 123]  the decision  instead of seeing
that power vested in just a
.__________________________  few."  11969,  551
Paulo Freire  "In contrast with  the  "I repeat: the investigation  of  "Unfortunately,  those who  "[O]ppressors  use the banking  "Authentic  liberation-the
Educator-  antidialogical  and non-  thematics  involves the  espouse the cause  of  concept  of education  in  process of humanization-is
communicative  'deposits'  of  investigation  of the people's  liberation are themselves  conjunction  with a  not another  deposit to be
Community  the banking  method  of  thinking-thinking which  surrounded  and influenced  by  paternalistic  social  action  made in men. Liberation is a
education,  the program  occurs  only in and among  the climate  which  generates  apparatus,  within which  the  praxis: the action and
content of the problem-posing  men together  seeking  out  the banking  concept, and  oppressed  receive  the  reflection  of men upon their
method-dialogical par  reality. I cannot  thinkfor  often do not perceive its true  euphemistic  title of'welfare  world in order to transform it.
excellence-is constituted  others or without  others,  nor  significance  or its  recipients.' They  are treated  Those truly committed  to the
and organized  by the students'  can others  thinkfor me...  dehumanizing  power.  as individual  cases, as  cause of liberation  can accept
view of the world,  where their  The more educators  and the  Paradoxically,  then, they  marginal  men who deviate  neither  the mechanistic
own generative  themes are  people investigate  the  utilize this same instrument  of  from the general  configura-  concept  of consciousness  as
found." [Freire 1970,  101]  people's  thinking, and are  alienation  in what they  tion of a 'good,  organized,  an empty vessel  to be filled,
thus jointly educated,  the  consider an effort  to liberate."  and  just' society....  nor the use of banking
more they continue  to  [1970,  66]  The solution is not to  methods of domination
investigate. Education  and  'integrate'  them into the  (propaganda,  slogans-
thematic  investigation,  in the  structure of oppression,  but to  deposits) in the name of
problem-posing  concept  of  transform  that structure  so  liberation."  [1970, 66]
education,  are simply dif-  they can become  'beings  for
ferent moments  of the same  themselves.' Such
process." [1970, 100-1]  transformation,  of course,
would undermine  the
oppressors'  purposes; hence
their utilization  of the
banking  concept of education
to avoid the threat of student
conscienztizaeao. " [1970, 60-
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E.F. Schumacher  "It is quite wrong to assume  "Who are the helpers and who  "[Ifl the rural people  of the  "Nothing becomes truly 'one's  "We should  be talking  about
that poor people  are generally  are those to be helped:  The  developing  countries  are  own' except on the basis of  getting  the people  to use their
Dev.  Agency-  unwilling to change; but the  helpers, by and large, are rich,  helped  to help themselves, I  some genuine  effort or  own labor power, with their
LDC  proposed  change must stand  educated (in a somewhat  have no doubt that a genuine  sacrifice.  A gift of material  own intelligence  (which is not
in some organic relationship  specialized sense), and town-  development  will ensue,  goods can be appropriated  by  incapable of picking  up
to what they are doing  based.  Those who most need  [But it] cannot be 'produced'  the recipient  without cffort or  improved methods  from
already, and they are rightly  help are poor, uneducated,  by skilful grafting operations  sacrifice;  it therefore  rarely  outsiders),  and their own local
suspicious  of, and resistant to,  and rurally based....  The  carried  out by foreign  becomes 'his own' and is all  resources  and materials to
radical changes proposed  by  methods of production,  the  technicians  or an indigenous  too  frequently and easily  provide,  in the first place, for
town-based  and office-bound  patterns  of consumption,  the  elite that has lost contact with  treated as a windfall.... The  their own fundamental  needs,
innovators who approach  systems of ideas and of values  the ordinary  people.  It can  gift of material  goods makes  which are good,  clothing, and
them in the spirit of: 'You just  that suit relatively  affluent  succeed  only if it is carried  people  dependent,  but the gift  shelter,  and certain  communal
get out of the way and I shall  and educated city people  are  forward  as a broad, popular  of knowledge  makes them  assets like roads, wells, and
show you how useless you are  unlikely to suit poor, semi-  'movement  of reconstruction'  free-provided  it is the right  public  buildings.  " [1964,
and how splendidly  the job  illiterate peasants.  Poor  with the primary emphasis on  king of knowledge,  of course.  370]
can be done with a lot of  peasants  cannot suddenly  the full utilisation  of the  ... This, then, should  become  "The altemative  to coercion
foreign money and outlandish  acquire the outlook and habits  drive, enthusiasm,  the ever-increasing  cannot  be found when
equipment."'  [1973, 200]  of sophisticated city people.  intelligence,  and the labour  preoccupation  of aid  spiritual  realities  are
If the people cannot  adapt  power of everyone.  Success  programmes-to  make  men  dismissed as being of no
themselves to the methods,  cannot be obtained by some  self-reliant  and independent  account or treated  as merely
then the methods  must be  form of magic produced  by  by the generous  supply  of the  subservient to economic  aims.
adapted to the people.  This is  scientists,  technicians,  or  appropriate  intellectual gifts,  It cannot  be found when the
the whole crux of the matter."  economic planners.  It can  gifts of relevant  knowledge  people are considered  as
[1973, 1921  come only through a process  on the methods of self-help."  objects to be driven, cajoled,
of growth involving the  [1973,  197]  or manipulated.  Perhaps  the
education,  organization, and  best-perhaps  even the
discipline  of the whole pop-  only-effective  slogan for aid
ulation." [1973, 204-5]  is: 'Find out what the people
are trying to do and help them
to do it better."'  [1964, 374]
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